Question : “The dispute between Secretariat and Directorate is the result of Generalist vs. Specialist controversy.” Analyse.
(2007)
Answer : The observation of split system in Indian Administration generated a dichotomy in form of Secretariat Vs. Directorate. The process of integration and differentiation of many administrative functions further strengthened this dichotomy. This integration and differentiation is nothing but dichotomy of Generalist and Specialist.
In theory, the Secretariat and the Directorate are expected to follow certain guidelines which are fundamental to sustain harmony in their mutual functioning and relationship.
But reality is that all these fundamental guidelines are hardly practised. Infact, the relations between Secretariat and Directorate are of totally harsh, suspicious and full of agony and mistrust.
The Secretariat bears upon a sense of Superiority over Directorate. There is attendency of interference on the part of Secretariat, even in the routine matter of the Directorate. Even the matters related to personnel and financial administration are generally monitored and, upto an extent, controlled by the Secretariat.
The main causes behind this dispute are many. But the dispute of Specialist vs. Generalist bears prime importance. The Secretariat are generally manned by officer of Generalist cadre, i.e. mainly of IAS. On the other hand, the Directorate’s are manned by Specialist who are masters in any particular field or skill.
Since the convention and observation of administrative practices in India facilitates superiority of Generalists over Specialists as the all superior positions are occupied by the personnel of generalist cadre, therefore the Specialists always has to be subordinate to the Generalists.
Apart from these, there are other factors which contributes to disharmony between Generalists and Specialists.
There have certain recommendations of many committees for reducing the dispute between the Generalist and the Specialist, thereby reducing the dispute between Secretariat and the Directorate. The Fulton Committee Report (1966) favoured specialisationof Public Services in Britain. The Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) 1969 favoured.
There is no denying of the fact that superiority of Generalist/Secretariat over Specialist/Directorate is nothing but a colonial hangover.
In todays era of Globalisation, Liberalisation, Specialisation and resultant higher complexities, the Specialists must be promoted at par with the Generalist.
Since the process of policy implementation is no less important than policy formulation, therefore Directorate must also get an equal platform with Secretariat. Infact, the output, sustainability and credibility of administration depends upon cordial relation between Secretariat and Directorate not on their dispute.
Question : “Because of several judicial pronouncements, Governors in states are no longer viewed as agents of the ‘Party in Power’ at the central level.” Evaluate.
(2007)
Answer : The Governor of any state wears two hats, one that of as head of state and other as an agent of the Centre.
Theoretically, he is the model of a nominal head like the President at the Centre. Practically, he is the faithful employee of the Centre and as such it would not be wrong to treat him as the agent of the Union Government to act like its ‘eyes and ears’ on the spot. But, of late, the judiciary has forced them to work
more as the head of state rather than as an agent of the Centre.
The Indian political system witnessed a negative trend where ‘Party in Power’ at the central level misused the office of Governor against opposition party at the state level, mainly for parochial political interests.
States like Karnataka, Bihar, U.P. have been witnessed a well-marked degradation in office of Governor’s esteem and dignity.
The provision of Article 356 has been invoked on more than one hundred occasions so far ever since its first experiment in Punjab in 1951 till its unusual use in Karnataka in 1989 and in the BJP ruled States of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh in 1992.
Though the matter relating to the justifiability of the emergency provisions attracted the attention of the courts on several occasions, it could have a concrete form of its own in 1993 when the Jabalpur Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court struck down the Presidential proclamation dismissing the BJP government there is December 1992.
The matter was taken to the Supreme Court in appeal. The Apex Court heard a bench of petitions and delivered a path-breaking judgement on 10 March, 1994 in the Bommai Case. It clearly established the broad guidelines for election of Governor, use ofdiscretionary powers, removal of Governors, method of appointment of Chief Minister and other related things. It clearly emphasized that Governor is a constitutional head of State under Article 154.
In 2005, the act of the Governor of Jharkhand was also scrutinised by the Court. In the same year again when Govenror Sh. Buta Singh of Bihar recommended for the imposition of President rule in Bihar without inviting any party for making government, the Supreme Court termed his decision as unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court again recalled the guidelines given in the Bommai Case and advised the Centre to act accordingly.
In cooperative federal set up, the states must be given sufficient freedom to run their administration without any pressure from outside. The office of Governor has to play a crucial role in this.
Question : “The main problem of Centre-State relations in India is bottlenecks in fiscal federalism”. Comment.
(2006)
Answer : The Indian federation has been accused of unusually tilted towards the union, where the union has more powers than the state and the constitution has given it more of a unitary character than a federation. There are many areas of conflict between the centre and the state one of which is the financial relations, collectively called the ‘fiscal federalism’.
According to the constitution our states enjoys some amount of financial autonomy. They have the right to collect taxes and also to spend the money in the way approved by the state legislatures.
But problem arises from the fact that their source of earnings are not much and their expenditure is more, due to which they have to depend on the union for the extra amount of money for their administrative purposes.
The union has been given more power relatively in the constitution. There are taxes which are levied, collected and dispersed in the states by the union. There are some other taxes which are levied by union but collected by the states.
If we see closely the constitutions provisions given in the Articles from 268 to Article 281 then we will find that the union’s say is much more and the states have to remain unusually dependent upon the union. The financial autonomy given to state is less.
With changing time and the style of functioning there is more need of funds for developmental purposes but the states have always to see towards union for the funds which is provided to them according to the formula and rules devised by the financial commission (Article 280). For that reasons the states have to present their plans to the union and then union decides on the amount of funds.
Sometimes their demands are rejected as the union do not find any quality in their plans. This irritates the states. The conditions are worse when there is different party in rule in the union and the states. Some states accuses the union of unusual preference to those states where the same party is in rule.
The grant-in aid is another mechanism under which the union provides funds for the development of infrastructure and other developmental activities. The grant-in-aid depends upon the decision of the planning commission. Although the National Development Council headed by Prime Minister and all the states among its members decides on the grant in aids, the planning commission also comes into the picture. As both these bodies are headed by Prime Minister the union has the last laugh.
One more bone of contention is the audit of state’s accounts by the union agency i.e. CAG. The CAG is responsible for auditing the accounts of states. The states feel reluctant to a alien auditors. The union sometime uses the CAG’s report to criticize the state government.
Under Article 360 during the financial emergency the state can be deprived of all its financial powers or it can be directed by the union to practice canon of propriety in order to save funds.
All these issue needs a proper redressal as for any healthy federation it is indispensable that the union and the state must work harmoniously.
Question : “The Chief Minister symbolizes ruling power structure and is the real executive head of the state government”. Discuss the above statement in the light of his position in a coalition govt.
(2005)
Answer : The Chief Minister is the executive head of the state representing the leader of the majority party in the Legislative Assembly to form the government. Chief Minister’s position in single ruling party is found to be quite strong vis-à-vis to the coalition government where his position is unstable.
The appointment of the chief minister falls within the discretionary powers of the governor, though the element of discretion should not be allowed to prevail in an unscrupulous manner.
The position of the chief minister becomes very precarious when he leads a coalition government. The position of the chief minister in many cases was seriously undermined to the extent that he virtually came under the influence and command of his deputy. There were claims and counter-claims, which resulted in the creation of the office of deputy chief minister. Sometimes a deputy chief Minister may try to outsmart the chief minister himself. The position of some other minister appeared so sound that the chief minister virtually lost the privilege of being first among equals’. What to say of his being ‘a moon among the lesser stars’ or ‘ a master of his ministers’. Thus men like Charan Singh, Govind Naryan Singh and Ajoy Mukherjee as heads of coalition governments proved to be puppet chief ministers. Their position in a coalition set up was undermined by the coordination committee of all constituent partners. Contrary to all constitutional provisions and usages, the chief minister tendered his resignation not to the Governor but to this body. He sought to constitute and reshuffle his cabinet with the sanction of this body alone. Te chief minister is thus always fighting the battle of political survival. Sometimes he is placating the prospective defectors with more ministerships. At other times, he is at the back and call of co-ordination committees or he seeks an alternative set of political alignments to keep himself in power.
The chief minister of a coalition government is virtually a prisoner of circumstances. The position of a congress chief minister in Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi era depended largely on the kind of relations he had with the high commend and the degree of support he received from powerful ‘patrons’ at the centre. As the congress had been running its government in most of the states and as its chief ministers had been acting at the behest of their real rulers sitting in New Delhi, it was concluded that chief ministers had reduced themselves to the status of the chief messengers of the party.
Question : “The position of governors towards exercising their discretion and powers has considerably changed after 1967”. Discuss.
(2004)
Answer : The period after 1967, saw political instability in many states, which hitherto was ruled by one political party i.e. Congress. Thus post-1967, saw or witnessed the mismatch of governments both at the centre and in some of states. This posed serious problem in front of Governor.
When there is a party in the state legislature with a clear-cut majority, the governor has no discretion because he has only to invite the leader of that party to become the Chief Minister. This did not pose any problem till 1967 because congress enjoyed a comfortable majority both at the centre and in the states. The post 1967 period posed a dilemma as the congress, after the general elections of 1967, was reduced to a minority states in as much as 8 states. Several questions of importance arose. In case there was no party with an absolute majority in the state legislature, should he invite the leader of the single largest party?This could be the congress again in some states and asking it to form the government would be wrong. It we look from masses point of view, the voters may or may not have voted in favour of the opposition: other option left with the governor that he should ask the leader of the single largest opposition party or a group of parties merged into a coalition to form the government? However noted constitutional experts have supported the view that the leader of the opposition should be invited unless his changes of forming the government are bleak. The term stability is taken to mean not only the numerical superiority of the ruling party but also its ability to hold on the majority strength and continuing with it. In both cases, the problem becomes embarrassing and complicated due to the presence of independents in the legislature and defections from one party to other.
No easy solution are available and “whichever party or group of parties was called upon to form a government, stood the chance of converting itself into a majority by securing the support of defectors from other parties by promising ministerial office to the leader of the defectors”. In this case, it would be difficult for the governor to take correct decision.
For this purpose the Governors, have generally employed three methods: list system, parade system or physical verification and list-cum-parade system. Under the first system, he can ask the contenders to come out with a list of their supporters and to enquire from each member on the list about his choice. If the balance is held by the independents he must enquire from each independent, his verdict.
The parade system is the physical verification of the list in the Assembly. He must summon the session of the Assembly and ask the contenders to show their strength without the least possible delay. In case of both systems, it is known as the list-cum-parade method.
Question : “The highly significant and elevated position of chief secretary is significantly undermined in practice to-day”.
(2004)
Answer : The office of the chief secretary is unique to states, it is without a parallel in the administrative landscape of the entire country. This functionary is the nerve centre of the state secretariat.
But this position is being undermined nowadays due to some political reasons.
The post of chief secretary has been kept out of the tenure system i.e., once appointed he either retires or goes to the centre because he is the seniormost civil servant at the state level.
But, in reality it is no followed always. Sometimes even a junior IAS is appointed chief secretary superseding senior one on grounds of political, caste, religion etc. Whenever a new government takes place it is invariably found that the CM unceremoniously removes the incumbent chief secretary and a person of his own choice comes there. But this is not a good practice.
Therefore, only the senior most civil servants must be appointed chief secretary in order to depoliticize this post.
The office of chief secretary should be rotated among the top official civil servants of the state by giving sufficiently long tenure as Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) has also recommended 3-4 years. By the process of rotation appointment process can also be depoliticized.
Thus, depoliticization of this chief functionary post is essential to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness and to make the office of chief secretary a dignified one.
Question : “Article 163 makes the Governor the sole judge in matters in which he is require to act in his discretion”. Explain.
(2003)
Answer : The relation between the Governor and his ministers is similar to that between the president and his ministers, with this important difference that while the constitution does not empower the president to exercise any function ‘in his discretion’, it authorizes the governor to exercise some functions ‘in his discretion’. In this respect, the principle of cabinet responsibility in the state differ from that in Union.In the exercise of the functions, which the Governor is empowered to exercise in his discretion, he will not be required to act according to the advice of his ministers or even to seek such advice. Again, if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as regards which the governor is required by the constitution to act in his discretion.
The decision of the Governor shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called into question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion Art. 163 (2).
However, the authority of the governor even in the discretionary field is not under strained. If it is misused, either as a result of personal ambitions or as partisan in the currents and cross-currents of state-politics, the president can always check him, if necessary, he may even remove him.
It would be profitable to look at a few possible cases wherein the Governor may have to exercise his discretion.
In general way, the governor’s discretion may be underlined in two parts:(1) the explicit discretion mentioned in the constitution i.e. the constitutional discretion and (2) the implicit discretion which is derived from exigencies of the political situation. It may be said as ‘situational discretion’. The Governor has marginal discretion in a particular situation. It was the objective of the framers that the situational discretion would be exercised not in ordinary circumstances but under the pressing needs of the political circumstances existing in the state.
The occasion where the governor’s marginal discretion may be exercised are as follows:
Thus, Art. 163 give enough scope to Governor to use his discretionary power.
Question : “Among several other problems the problem of financial relationship is perhaps the most complex one.” Explain in the context of recent developments in Union-State relationships in India.
(2000)
Answer : Indian financial system has a unique stamp of its own. Several streams of administrative and cultures have left their foot prints on the sands of financial history in India. Finance is life-blood of all monetised socio-economic formations ranging from simple nuclear families to complex national and international organizations. Financial administration relates to the system, which generates, regulates and distributes monetary resources needed for the sustenance and growth of organisations.
India has chosen a federal structure in which a clear distinction is made between the union and state functions and sources of revenue, but the residual powers belong to the Centre. Although the states have been assigned certain taxes which are levied and collected by them, they also share in the revenue of certain union taxes, and there are certain other taxes which are levied and collected by the union but the proceeds of which wholly go to the states. In addition, the states receive grants in aid of their revenue from the union, which further increases the amount of transfers between the two levels of governments. The transfer of resources from the central government to the states is an essential feature of the present financial system.
The constitution of India makes a clear division of fiscal powers between the union and state governments. The principle adopted for this classification is that taxes which have inter-state base are levied by the union, while with local base are levied by the states. The residuary power belongs to the union.
The Union taxes as laid down in List I, seventh schedule of the constitution, are as under:
Thus, the Indian constitution, being federal in character, has indicated the nature and scope of functions of the union and the state governments and also the taxes allocated to them. At the same time, the framers of the constitution were aware that allocation of financial resources did not correspond with the assigned functions and that the resources gap in the state might widen over the years. They provide for the distribution or devolution of resources from the centre to the states. It was specifically for this purpose that Article 280 provides for the setting up of finance commission every five years or earlier. In regard to the financial relations between the union and the states too, can find the general tendency of Indian federalism for centralisation.
Centre-state conflict on finances : In the last few years, there has been growing conflict and tension between the Indian union and the states in the matter of finances. This conflict has often been aggravated by political and ideological differences between the different parties governing the centre and states.
The framers of the Indian constitution provided for grants and loans, so that the centre might come to help by those states which more in difficulty and also to bring about balanced development of the different regions. The use of grants and loans in the last thirty years or so, however, has resulted in the complete domination and control of the states by the centre and to a certain extent, even financial inresponsibility and indiscipline on the part of the states. The phenomenal growth in loan assistance to the states and the political pressure amounting to blackmail by the centre through the instrument of grants have frightened the states. Hence, there has been an insistent demand for a comprehensive review of centre-state relations in the general and centre-state financial relations in particular. The J.K. Tharang Committee (Report of the Taxation enquiry committee on Kerala government), the Rajmanar Committee on centre and state relations (1978) adopted by the West Bengal cabinet led by the CPI-M United Front - all these have same theme viz., political and financial autonomy for the states and drastic restrictions of the powers and financial resources of the centre. The states complaint about inadequate financial resources and their demand for large taxation power would more reasonable if they had fully exploited the resources they command. They are not only reluctant to tax agricultural incomes but have been abolishing land levies despite the gaping deficits in political carnage. It is also an accepted fact; state tax administration is hopelessly corrupt and inefficient. Still the centre has been sympathetic to their pleas for assistance and their share of the divisible pool of central taxes has progressively increased over the years.
The inadequacy of financial resources was sought to be made up the use of central grants-in-aid. The grants-in-aid were also meant to help backward states to come up to the level of others.
It is thus clear that states have become increasingly depend at on the for their expenditure. Such a dependence is the natural consequence of the enormous command enjoyed by the centre over relatively larger and expending revenues resources. The massive indebtness of the states breeding a sense of irresponsibility among the borrowings states. In a sense the position of dependence on the centre has suited the states as well. It has enabled them to avoid taking unpopular tax measures and to attribute their inefficiency and failure to the centre.
In the financial sphere, the Sarkaria Commission has favoured the amendment of the constitution to provide for sharing of corporation tax between the centre and the states but has respected all other suggestions for enlarging the divisible pool. The commission has recommended the setting up of expert committees to examine taxation reforms and resource mobilisation, to study in depth the agricultural income tax and to review the loan grant pattern. The commission has accepted that the present division of functions between the finance commission and planning commission as reasonable and that it should continue. However, it has suggested that the term of reference of the finance commission should be drawn up in consultation with the states governments. Finally, the commission has recommended legislation to levy consignments tax and constitutional amendment to enable levy of tax on advertisements in broadcasting. The central government has not excepted all the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission. In any case, the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations are not the last word on the question of centre-state relations. The question is still wide-open. However, on the question of centre-states financial relations, the states welcome one recommendation of commission viz, the inclusion of corporation tax in divisible pool.
Question : Maintenance of law and order is a state subject but the union government can deploy armed forces in any state.”
(2000)
Answer : Maintenance of law and order is a state subject as per the Indian constitution. Items 1, 2 and 4 in list II of the Seventh schedule state that public order, police and prisons come under the state subject. The state governments are empowered to legislate in the matter. However, under concurrent powers, the centre also has authority to legislate in case of punishment of crime. Further the centre is empowered under item 2(A) of list-I of the Seventh schedule to legislate on the deployment of the armed forces of the Union in any state. The constitutional distribution of power between the centre and the state in respect of the powers that are essential for the maintenance of law and order brings out the interdependence of the centre and states. In the matter of maintenance of law and order certain amount of understanding between the centre and the states is essential in proper maintenance of law and order in the country.
Question : “In the Chief Secretary, the State government has an officer whose counter part does not obtain in the Union Government”. Elucidate.
(2000)
Answer : There is no office in the Union Government which can be equated with that of Chief Secretary in the state. To some extent, the cabinet secretary, at the central level can be called as the counter part of the Chief Secretary. However the functions performed and the roles assumed by the Chief Secretary in the state administration are so vast, varied and wide that they are shared at the Central level, by the Cabinet Secretary, the Personnel Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Finance Secretary.
This can be evident by looking at the functions performed by Chief Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary are:
The differences between Chief Secretary and Cabinet Secretary are:
Now, looking the above mentioned work of Chief Secretary it is clearly evident that no other officers even in the Union Government can equate with office of Chief Secretary in the State Government.
Question : “It would be a gross fallacy to regard the institution of the Governor as a faint presence like a full moon at midday”. Comment.
(1999)
Answer : The Governor’s is a high constitutional office. The Governors in some of the states by using their powers purely for partisan and personal ends, not only deprived the office of its lustre and dignity, but also brought disrepute to it, which should have been avoided.
The Governor has two important roles to play. As the representative of the centre in the state, it is his responsibility to see that the federal balance and political stability are not sought to be destroyed or undermined. In his role as the head of the state government, he has discretionary powers. He is not merely a figurehead or a nominal head or a passive spectator. If there is great range of political disharmony in the state and political stability is undermined, the role of the Governor naturally becomes much larger. Controversies regarding the role and position of the Governor arose due to changed political situation especially as no one political party could secure a clean majority. This provided Governor an opportunity to exercise their discretionary powers, but it should be used in good governance and not in favour of party politics.
Thus, this office is of vital importance having multifaceted role that Governor is linchpin of constitutional apparatus, that Governor’s office assures continuity of government and that it should not be dispensed with.
Question : “The legislative and executive powers of the states are comprehensive, but the exercise of these powers are subject to regulation, abridgement and even suspension by the Union.” Comment.
(1999)
Answer : The states embrace extensive legislative and executive powers, but the implementation of these powers are subject to regulation by the Union.
For instance, when a bill is presented before the Governor after its passage by the Houses of the legislature, it will be open to the governor to take any of the following steps either declare his assent to the bill, or withholds his assent to the bill, in which case the bill fails to become a law. Even governor may reserve a bill for the consideration of the president.
It is clear that a bill which is reserved for the consideration of the president shall have no legal effect until the president declares his assent to it. But no time limit is imposed on president either to declare or withhold the assent. Further, the governor’s power to make ordinances (Art. 213), having the force of an act of the State Legislature, is similar to the ordinance-making power of the president. Similarly, executive powers of the states are restricted subject to Union government’s regulations.
The union government exercises effective control over the state through giving of necessary directions to them. This power of giving directions is backed up by a coercive sanction for the enforcement of such directions as laid down in Article 365 of the constitution. It stipulates that where any state has failed to comply with or to give effect to any directions given in the exercise of the power of the union under any of the provisions of this constitution, it shall be lawful for the president to hold that a situation has arisen in which the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provision of the constitution.
Also, in respect of maintenance of public order state’s executive power is restricted by union. Thus the state’s executive and legislative power is subject to Union government’s regulation.
Question : “The legislative relations between Union and States governments are more biased towards Union government”. Comment.
(1997)
Answer : The distribution of legislative powers in each federation reflects in the nature and character of the policy agreed upon by those who were responsible for drawing up the constitution.
The basic provisions regarding the distribution of power between the centre and state govt. are in Part XI of the constitution. The three lists (union list, state list and concurrent list) are embodied in the seventh schedule of the constitution. Most of the subjects under above lists are more or less inclined towards union. Further parliament can legislate on the subjects of state lists, through Article 249, 250, 252 and 253.
Again, union has very often sought to dictate its policy to the state legislatures with regard to such matters by improper use of its power under Article 201 with respect to Bills passed by the state legislatures.
Thus, the entire system of the distribution of legislative powers undoubtedly display a strong tendency towards a high degree of centralisation. This scheme seeks to reconcile the imperatives for a strong centre with the need for state autonomy.
Question : “ The states are constitutionally obliged to ensure that the laws passed by parliament are implemented.” Explain constitution policy fully.
(1997)
Answer : The idea of the Union giving directions to the States is foreign and repugnant to a truly federal system. But this idea was taken by the framers to our constitution from the Government of India Act, 1935, in view of the peculiar conditions of this country and, particularly, the circumstances out of which the federation emerged.
It is to be noted that the constitution prescribes a coercive sanction for the enforcement of the directions issued under any of the foregoing powers, namely, the power of the president to make a proclamation under Art. 356. This is provided in Art. 365 as follows, “ where any state has failed to comply with, or to give effect to any directions given in the exercise of the executive power of the union under any of the provisions of this constitution, it shall be lawful for the president to hold that a situation has arrived in which the government of the state cannot be run according to provision of this constitution.
Under Art. 258 (2), while legislating on a union subject, parliament may delegate powers to the state governments and their officers in so far as the statute is applicable in the respective states.
Further union controls state in other important occasions like emergencies. The constitution provides for three different kinds of abnormal situations which call for a departure form the normal governmental machinery set up by the constitution – (1) external aggression (Art. 352) (2) failure of constitutional machinery in the states (Art. 356) and (3) financial emergency (Art. 360).
Even in normal times, the constitution has devised techniques of control over the states by the union to ensure that the state governments do not interfere with the legislative and executive policies of the union and also to ensure the efficiency and strength of each individual unit which is essential for the strength of the union.
Again, it has been strictly laid down in the constitution under Art. 257, that the executive power of every state shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the union, and the executive of the union shall extent to the giving of such directions to a state as may appear to the Govt. of India to be necessary for that purpose.
And where in carrying out any direction given to a state under Clause (2) as to the construction or maintenance at any means of communication or under Clause (3) as to the measures to be taken for the protection of any railway, costs have been incurred in excess of those which would have been incurred in the discharge of the normal duties of the state.
Question : “The Union-State financial relations, as provided in the constitution, are biased towards centre in the context of borrowing.” Comment.
(1996)
Answer : The framers of the constitution realizing that the Union and State governments would not be able raise sufficient funds through taxation, made provision to enable them to borrow on the security of their consolidated funds.
Article 292, which authorized the Union Government to do so, placed no territorial limitations. While the states could also borrow upon the security of their consolidated funds, Article 293 provided that they could do so only within the territory of India.
Thus, the union shall have unlimited power of borrowing, upon the security of the revenues of India either within India or outside.
The borrowing power of state is however, subject no. of limitations like (1) It cannot borrow outside India. (2) State Executive shall have the power to borrow subject to following limitations:
Thus, financial power of borrowing loans is tilted more toward in favour of Union than State.
Question : “The Governor of a state wears two hats, therefore, dilemmas have arisen in practice.” Comment.
(1996)
Answer : The executive head of the state is the Governor and all the executive actions are carried on in name of the Governor. He exercises the executive power directly or with the help of the Council of Ministers. Governor appoints the Chief Minister of the State and the other Ministers are appointed by him on the advice of the Chief Minister.
The Governor has a dual role to play. He is the constitutional head of the state government. He is also to act as the agent of the Central Government. In the capacity of the constitutional head, the Governor acts as an advisor to the Council of Ministers who are the real administrators of the state. Every act of administration of the state is carried but under the name of the Governor. As a representative of the president, he is responsible to see that the constitutional responsibilities of the centre for the proper governance of the whole country as properly discharged. He has to inform the centre of the working of the constitutional machinery of the state.
The dual role of the governor can sometimes lead to a conflict of loyalties. Ordinarily, the president depends upon the Governor for the discharge of his constitutional responsibilities with regard to the administration of the state.
All the same time, the Governor of a state is an essential part of the constitutional machinery and fulfils an essential purpose and renders an essential service. In certain situations, his duty to protect the constitution make it imperative for him to act in his discretion.