Social & Political Ideas

Answer : It is commonly argued that the problem of the relationship between liberty and equality is crucial to an adequate understanding of democracy. As posited, the argument implies to some thinkers, such as de Tocqueville, that a maximization of equality necessarily leads to a maximization of uniformity and therefore, by definitional inference, to a minimization of liberty. In this case, the argument continues, the door is left wide open for totalitarianism to be established, for individual liberty to be sacrificed for equality. In other words it is said that equality awakens in men several propensities extremely dangerous to, freedom. Men tend to despise and undervalue the rights of private persons. The rights of private persons among democratic nations are commonly of small importance, of recent growth, and extremely precarious; the consequence is that they are often sacrificed without regret and almost always violated without remorse. But that is not all, for, the principle of equality begets two tendencies; the one leads men straight to independence and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a longer, more secret, but more certain route, to slavery. It is clear that the principle of equality is inimical to both individual and societal well-being since it leads either to anarchy or to servitude. In other words, no true democracy can obtain in a context of maximum equality. The logical conclusion of this argument is that, in order to have true democracy and thereby preserve liberty, equality must be minimized. The defenders of equality, on the other hand, retort by asserting that unless individual differences (social, political, and economic) are absolutely minimized, democratic government cannot operate, regardless of individual freedom. Indeed, they maintain, it is this unlimited freedom of the individual which spells the doom modern age of democracy. Society is divided, in its economic and social, though not necessarily in its political, relations into classes which are ends, and classes which are instruments. Like property, with which in the past it has been closely connected, liberty becomes in such circumstances the privilege of a class, not the possession of a nation. Thus, if only a few or even some are free, the society cannot be described as democratic. These two arguments have been advanced in their rudimentary form by way of an introduction to the discussion which follows. The problem is no doubt crucial, not only because it is related to our understanding of democracy but indeed because it rises a fundamental issue that involves the very being of man. But this problem no longer exists when both liberty and equality are understood as complementary to each other. There is no meaning of liberty if equality is not there. On the other hand equality ceases to exist if one is not free to that extent where one can use his freedom for the development of his well being. Hence the problem ends if we there is a balance between liberty and equality and in fact both are complementary to each other.

Answer : ‘Equality’ is a contested concept: “People who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging”. The term “equality”, “equal,” and “equally” signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between groups of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features.

‘Equality’ needs to thus be distinguished from ‘identity’, this concept signifying that one and the same object corresponds to itself in all its features: an object that can be referred to through various individual terms, proper names, or descriptions. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’, the concept of merely approximate correspondence. Thus, to say e.g. that men are equal is not to say that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than ‘sameness.’ In distinction to numerical identity, a judgment of equality presumes a difference between the things being compared.

According to this definition, the notion of ‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality is self-contradictory. Two non-identical objects are never completely equal; they are different at least in their spatiotemporal location. If things do not differ they should not be called ‘equal,’ but rather, more precisely, ‘identical,’ as e.g., the morning and evening star. Here usage might vary. Some authors do consider absolute qualitative equality admissible as a borderline concept. ‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both to describe and prescribe, as with “thin”: “you are thin” and “you are too thin.” The approach taken to defining the standard of comparison for both descriptive and prescriptive assertions of the concept of equality is very important. In the case of descriptive use of equality, the common standard is itself descriptive, e.g. two people weigh the same.

A prescriptive use of equality is present when a prescriptive standard is applied, i.e., a norm or rule, e.g. people ought to be equal before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is a descriptive component, since the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which the rule or norm applies. For this reason, it helps to think of the idea of equality or for that matter inequality, understood as an issue of social justice, not as a single principle, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic core of today’s egalitarianism.

Answer : Ancient India’s foremost political theorist was Chanakya (also known as Kautiliya). He was a Brahmin minister and political advisor of Chandragupta Mauriya, the founder of Mauriya Dynasty in India and helped gain him power. Chankiya was from northern India. His masterpiece was the political treatise, Arthashastra that means “the science of material gain or polity”. This was written in 4th century B.C. Old Indian rulers adopted his governance and statecraft theories.

According to Kautilya theory of state the important organs of state consisted of the king, the ministers, the territory and people, the forts or towns, the treasury, the army, allies and inter state relations. This was the Indian political scientists’ theory of Saptanga, meaning “seven limbs”. Emphasis on one or the other increased or decreased as per the changing political environment. The Saptanga theory is applied frequently in writings of Chanakiya. Chanakiya recommended use of any methods by the ruler to attain his aim, without regard to morals or ethics. He thus was a ‘Political Realist’ who advised using any means, including gaining or retaining power. In the field of domestic politics, he recommended ways for the ruler to control and curtail the political ambitions of his opponents and even his own sons. He also highlighted the importance and relationship that economics have to politics.

In the field of foreign relations, they considered friendships and alliances as temporary expedients inspired by common interests or threats. When friendship was pleaded, it was only a mask hiding the real intentions. The intended victim was to be lulled into sleep. This was called Maya “the creation of an illusion”. In the realm of foreign policy it meant extending a temporary hand of friendship towards one’s hostile neighbour, in order to gain time or to deal with another threat, internally or externally or to prepare for an opportune time to strike later. The balance of power theory finds its application in Arthashastra’s Mandala (rings) or political circles of neighbours. They played a game of delicate balancing based on a pattern of concentric rings.

Adjacent states or neighbours were taken as unfriendly competitors or enemies forming the first ring. They were to be neutralized through friendship and by forming alliances with states immediately to the rear of one’s neighbour. This formed the outer ring. There were four main methods recommended for dealing with one’s hostile neighbour. The sage Indians considered that the king should deal in different ways with different categories of people. He was supposed to behave pleasantly with the learned, be ruthless with the enemy and deal in a moderate way with his subjects. Power abided only with the strong, cunning and daring. A strong central government under a king is noticed in their forms of governance. This was particularly the case during the reign of Chandragupta Mauriya and Ashoka, the two most powerful rulers of Ancient India. This was a visible feature even after independence, when modern India had a strong central government under Nehru from 1947 to 1964, and again during the two periods of Indira Gandhi’s rule.

Answer : The concept of negative liberty refers to freedom from interference by other people. According to Thomas Hobbes, “a free man is he that in those things which bsy his strength and wit he is able to do is not hindered to do what he hath the will to do.” The distinction between negative and positive liberty was drawn by Isaiah Berlin in his lecture “Two Concepts of Liberty.” According to Berlin, the distinction is deeply embedded in the political tradition. The notion of negative liberty is associated with British philosophers such as Locke, Hobbes, and Adam Smith, and positive liberty with continental thinkers, such as Hegel, Rousseau, Herder, and Marx.

In Berlin’s words, “liberty in the negative sense involves an answer to the question: ‘What is the area within which the subject a person or group of persons is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons’.” Restrictions on negative liberty are imposed by a person, not by natural causes or incapacity. The distinction between positive and negative liberty is considered specious by socialist and Marxist political philosophers, who argue that positive and negative liberty are indistinguishable in practice, or that one cannot exist without the other. One might ask, “How is men’s desire for liberty to be reconciled with the need for authority?” Its answer by various thinkers provides a fault line for understanding their view on liberty but also a cluster of intersecting concepts such as authority, equality, and justice.

Hobbes and Locke give two influential and representative solutions to this question. As a starting point, both agree that a line must be drawn and a space sharply delineated where each individual can act unhindered according to their tastes, desires, and inclinations. This zone defines the sacrosanct space of personal liberty. But, they believe no society is possible without some authority, where the intended purpose of authority is to prevent collisions among the different ends and, thereby, to demarcate the boundaries where each person’s zone of liberty begins and ends. Where Hobbes and Locke differ is the extent of the zone. Hobbes, who took a rather negative view of human nature, argued that a strong authority was needed to curb men’s intrinsically wild, savage, and corrupt impulses. Only a powerful authority can keep at bay the permanent and always looming threat of anarchy. Locke believed, on the other hand, that men on the whole are more good than wicked and, accordingly, the area for individual liberty can be left rather at large.

Answer : Democracy is a form of government in which the supreme power is held completely by the people under a free electoral system. In political theory, democracy describes a small number of related forms of government and also a political philosophy. Even though there is no universally accepted definition of ‘democracy’, there are two principles that any definition of democracy includes. The first principle is that all members of the society have equal access to power and the second that all members enjoy universally recognized freedoms and liberties. But this kind is meaningless if there is an absence economic power.

One argument that Mill develops further than any previous philosopher is the harm principle. The harm principle holds that each individual has the right to act as he wants, so long as these actions do not harm others. If the action is self-regarding, that is, if it only directly affects the person undertaking the action, then society has no right to intervene, even if it feels the actor is harming himself. Economic Democracy is a socioeconomic philosophy that suggests transfer of decision-making authority from a small minority of corporate shareholders to the larger majority of public stakeholders. While there is no single definition or approach, all theories and real-world examples of Economic Democracy are based on a core set of fundamental assumptions. Proponents generally agree that modern conditions of economic instability tend to hinder or prevent society from earning enough income to purchase its output production.

Centralized corporate monopoly of common resources typically forces conditions of artificial scarcity upon the greater majority, resulting in socio-economic imbalances that restrict workers from access to economic opportunity and diminish consumer purchasing power. Assuming full political rights cannot be won without full economic rights, Economic Democracy suggests a variety of models, theories, and real-world examples for solving problems of economic instability and deficiency of effective demand. Overall, Economic Democracy promotes universal access to common resources that are typically privatized by corporate capitalism and centralized by state socialism. Supporting agendas include democratic cooperatives, fair trade, social credit, and the regionalization of food production and currency.

Answer : The terms “equality”, “equal,” and “equally” signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between groups of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. If one does not enjoy equality in socio-political field, the term looses its meaning for him. Actually these are the spheres of life where one should have equality only then he will be able to get justice in the real sense of the term provided that he is economically independent.

Social equality is a social state of affairs in which all people within a specific society or isolated group have the same status in a certain respect. At the very least, social equality includes equal rights under the law, such as security, voting rights, freedom of speech and assembly, and the extent of property rights. However, it also includes access to education, health care and other social securities. It also includes equal opportunities and obligations, and so involves the whole society. Social equality requires the lack of legally enforced social class or caste boundaries and the lack of unjustified discrimination motivated by an inalienable part of a person’s identity. For example, gender, age, origin, caste or class, income or property, language, religion, convictions, opinions, health or disability must not result in unequal treatment under the law and should not reduce opportunities unjustifiably.

Social equality, however, does not require communism or income equality. “Equal opportunities” is interpreted as being judged by ability, which is compatible with a free-market economy. A problem is horizontal inequality, the inequality of two persons of same origin and ability. Perfect social equality is an ideal situation that does, for various reasons, not exist in any society in the world today. The reasons for this are widely debated. Reasons cited for social inequality include commonly economics, immigration/emigration, foreign politics and national politics. Also, in complexity economics, it has been found that horizontal inequality arises in complex systems.

Answer : Many authors prefer to talk of positive and negative freedom. ‘Freedom from’ signifies freedom from whereas ‘freedom to’ signifies positive freedom In a famous essay first published in 1958, Isaiah Berlin called these two concepts of liberty or freedom negative and positive respectively. The reason for using these labels is that in the first case freedom seems to be a mere absence of something (i.e. of obstacles, barriers, constraints or interference from others), whereas in the second case it seems to require the presence of something (i.e. of control, self-mastery, self-determination or self-realization).

In Berlin’s words, we use the negative concept of freedom in attempting to answer the question “What is the area within which the subject, a person or group of persons, is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?”, whereas we use the positive concept in attempting to answer the question “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?”. It is useful to think of the difference between the two concepts in terms of the difference between factors that are external and factors that are internal to the agent. While theorists of negative freedom are primarily interested in the degree to which individuals or groups suffer interference from external bodies, theorists of positive freedom are more attentive to the internal factors affecting the degree to which individuals or groups act autonomously. Given this difference, one might be tempted to think that a political philosopher should concentrate exclusively on negative freedom, a concern with positive freedom being more relevant to psychology or individual morality than to political and social institutions.

The classic texts in the history of western political thought are divided over how these questions should be answered: theorists in the classical liberal tradition, like Constant, Humboldt, Spencer and Mill, are typically classed as answering ‘no’ and therefore as defending a negative concept of political freedom; theorists that are critical of this tradition, like Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and T.H. Green, are typically classed as answering ‘yes’ and as defending a positive concept of political freedom. In its political form, positive freedom has often been thought of as necessarily achieved through a collectivity. Put in the simplest terms, one might say that a democratic society is a free society because it is a self-determined society, and that a member of that society is free to the extent that he or she participates in its democratic process.

The negative concept of freedom, on the other hand, is most commonly assumed in liberal defences of the constitutional liberties typical of liberal-democratic societies, such as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech, and in arguments against paternalist or moralist state intervention. It is also often invoked in defences of the right to private property, although some have contested the claim that private property necessarily enhances negative liberty.

Answer : Equality’ is a contested concept: People who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging. Our first task is therefore to provide a clear definition of equality in the face of widespread misconceptions about its meaning as a political idea. The terms “equality”, “equal,” and “equally” signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between groups of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features.

‘Equality’ needs to thus be distinguished from ‘identity’ this concept signifying that one and the same object corresponds to itself in all its features: an object that can be referred to through various individual terms, proper names, or descriptions. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’, the concept of merely approximate correspondence. Thus, to say e.g. that men are equal is not to say that they are identical. As a political ideal equality demands equal treatment given by the state to its civilians. Description of the Ideal Democracy includes 5 conditions which are fulfilled by a society in which people are politically equal. These are:

• Effective participation
• Equality in voting
• Gaining enlighten understanding
• Final control of the agenda
• Inclusion

It does mean that everybody within the democratic group is subject to (or enjoys) the same conditions of political equality. While there can be, and there often is, disagreement about who should be included in a democratic group, it is clear that for political equality to exist within a certain group, the rules of regulation of political power must be applied equally to all the members of a group. Equality mandates that whenever a formal vote is taken to decide on a certain policy, all members can vote, and their votes have the same weight. The remaining three conditions seem to rise naturally from conditions which prevail in face-to-face, intimate democratic (or, equivalently, politically equal) groups. In such groups, all members can make “their views about what the policy” on any important issue “known to the other members of the group”, which is called effective participation. Any member can probe any other member to obtain information needed to understand an issue facing the group.

In this way, any member can come to understand the issue approximately as well as any other member of the group (enlightened understanding. Any member can put any item on the agenda and have a decision taken on it. This is a strict form of control of the agenda by the group members, ensuring that the opportunity for putting policy changes to a vote is available.

Answer : Justice is the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, rationality, law, natural law, fairness and equity. A conception of justice is one of the key features of society. Theories of justice vary greatly, but there is evidence that everyday views of justice can be reconciled with patterned moral preferences. Justice concerns the proper ordering of things and persons within a society. As a concept it has been subject to philosophical, legal, and theological reflection and debate throughout history. According to most theories of justice, it is overwhelmingly important: John Rawls, for instance, claims that “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.” Justice can be thought of as distinct from and more fundamental than benevolence, charity, mercy, generosity or compassion. There are different views on justice.

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, where punishment is forward-looking. Justified by the ability to achieve future social benefits resulting in crime reduction, the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome. There are two types of justice called retributive and distributive justice. Retributive justice regulates proportionate response to crime proven by lawful evidence, so that punishment is justly imposed and considered as morally-correct and fully deserved. Retribution also means prosperity, prosperity results in crime prevention. The law of retaliation is a military theory of retributive justice, which says that reciprocity should be equal to the wrong suffered; “life for life, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.” Distributive justice is directed at the proper allocation of things - wealth, power, reward, respect - between different people. A number of important questions surrounding justice have been fiercely debated over the course of western history: What does it demand of individuals and societies? What is the proper distribution of wealth and resources in society: equal, according to status, or some other arrangement? There is a myriad of possible answers to these questions from divergent perspectives on the political and philosophical spectrum.

Oppressive Law exercises an authoritarian approach to legislation which is “totally unrelated to justice”, a tyrannical interpretation of law is one in which the population lives under restriction from unlawful legislation. Some theorists, such as the classical Greeks, conceive of justice as a virtue—a property of people, and only derivatively of their actions and the institutions they create. Others emphasize actions or institutions, and only derivatively the people who bring them about. The source of justice has variously been attributed to harmony, divine command, natural law, or human creation. Social justice, sometimes called civil justice, refers to the concept of a society in which justice is achieved in every aspect of society, rather than merely the administration of law. It is generally thought of as a world which affords individuals and groups fair treatment and an impartial share of the benefits of society. (Different proponents of social justice have developed different interpretations of what constitutes fair treatment and an impartial share.) It can also refer to the distribution of advantages and disadvantages within a society.

The social justice scenario is to be investigated in the context of two streams of entitlements:

1. sustainable livelihood, which means access to adequate means of living, such as shelter, clothing, food, access to developmental means, employment; education, health, and resources;
2. social and political participation (enabling or empowering means), which is built on the guarantee of fundamental rights, and promotion and empowerment of the right to participation in the government, and access to all available means of justice, and on the basis of which “justice as a political program” becomes a viable reality.

In general justice dies mean (a) the right to food and water; (b) housing, which includes resettlement and rehabilitation; (c) access to education, (d) access to provisions of health and healthcare, (e) right to work, and (f) access to information and the right to communication. In short, one of the important ways justice is achievable is taking stock of various forms that have occasioned the articulation of ideas of social justice. Rawls has outlined some minimum conditions of justice. These are:

• Freedom of thought;
• Liberty of conscience as it affects social relationships on the grounds of religion, philosophy, and morality;
• Political liberties (e.g. representative democratic institutions, freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly);
• Freedom of association;
• Freedoms necessary for the liberty and integrity of the person (vim: freedom from slavery, freedom of movement and a reasonable degree of freedom to choose one’s occupation); and
• Rights and liberties covered by the rule of law.

Answer : One of the definitions of justice is “giving to each what he or she is due.” The problem is how to know what is “due”. Functionally, “justice” is a set of universal principles which guide people in judging what is right and what is wrong, no matter what culture and society they live in. Justice is one of the four “cardinal virtues” of classical moral philosophy, along with courage, temperance (self-control) and prudence (efficiency). (Faith, hope and charity are considered to be the three “religious” virtues.) Virtues or “good habits” help individuals to develop fully their human potentials, thus enabling them to serve their own self-interests as well as work in harmony with others for their common good.

The ultimate purpose of all the virtues is to elevate the dignity and sovereignty of the human person. Social justice encompasses economic justice. Social justice is the virtue which guides us in creating those organized human interactions we call institutions. In turn, social institutions, when justly organized, provide us with access to what is good for the person, both individually and in our associations with others. Social justice also imposes on each of us a personal responsibility to work with others to design and continually perfect our institutions as tools for personal and social development. Economic justice, which touches the individual person as well as the social order, encompasses the moral principles which guide us in designing our economic institutions. These institutions determine how each person earns a living, enters into contracts, exchanges goods and services with others and otherwise produces an independent material foundation for his or her economic sustenance.

The ultimate purpose of economic justice is to free each person to engage creatively in the unlimited work beyond economics, that of the mind and the spirit. Like every system, economic justice involves input, output, and feedback for restoring harmony or balance between input and output. Within the system of economic justice as defined by Louis Kelso and Mortimer Adler, there are three essential and interdependent principles: The Principle of Participation, The Principle of Distribution, and The Principle of Harmony. Like the legs of a three-legged stool, if any of these principles is weakened or missing, the system of economic justice will collapse. The principle of participation describes how one makes “input” to the economic process in order to make a living. It requires equal opportunity in gaining access to private property in productive assets as well as equality of opportunity to engage in productive work. The principle of participation does not guarantee equal results, but requires that every person be guaranteed by society’s institutions the equal human right to make a productive contribution to the economy, both through one’s labor (as a worker) and through one’s productive capital (as an owner). Thus, this principle rejects monopolies, special privileges, and other exclusionary social barriers to economic self-reliance.

The principle of distribution defines the “output” or “out-take” rights of an economic system matched to each person’s labor and capital inputs. Through the distributional features of private property within a free and open marketplace, distributive justice becomes automatically linked to participative justice, and incomes become linked to productive contributions. The principle of distributive justice involves the sanctity of property and contracts. It turns to the free and open marketplace, not government, as the most objective and democratic means for determining the just price, the just wage, and the just profit. Many confuse the distributive principles of justice with those of charity. Charity involves the concept “to each according to his needs,” whereas “distributive justice” is based on the idea “to each according to his contribution.” Confusing these principles leads to endless conflict and scarcity, forcing government to intervene excessively to maintain social order.

Distributive justice follows participative justice and breaks down when all persons are not given equal opportunity to acquire and enjoy the fruits of income-producing property. The principle of harmony encompasses the “feedback” or balancing principles required to detect distortions of either the input or output principles and to make whatever corrections are needed to restore a just and balanced economic order for all. This principle is violated by unjust barriers to participation, by monopolies or by some using their property to harm or exploit others.

Economic harmonies” is defined “Laws of social adjustment under which the self-interest of one man or group of men, if given free play, will produce results offering the maximum advantage to other men and the community as a whole.” This principle offers guidelines for controlling monopolies, building checks-and-balances within social institutions, and re-synchronizing distribution with participation (input). The first two principles of economic justice flow from the eternal human search for justice in general, which automatically requires a balance between input and outtake, i.e., “to each according to what he is due.” The problem here is that with the market economy there is no or least control of the state on the economy in the sense that market is guided by supply and demand. If a person contributes more to the society, it does mean that he is more capable. In that case the poor one will not have the same level playing field and he would be vulnerable enough to be dictated by the richer section of the society. Hence he would be able to enjoy the justice in the society something a human being deserves as his natural right.

Answer : Positive freedom refers to the opportunity and ability to act to fulfill one’s own potential, as opposed to negative freedom, which refers to freedom from restraint. Inherent to positive liberty is the idea that liberty is the ability of citizens to participate in their government. As Isaiah Berlin noted, positive liberty is interested in action by citizens in the government. This is why he called it positive freedom, for pro-action. Berlin distinguished between two forms or concepts of liberty – negative liberty and positive liberty – and argued that the latter concept has often been used to cover up abuse, leading to the curtailment of people’s negative liberties “for their own good”. Although Berlin’s 1958 essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”, is typically acknowledged with being the first to explicitly draw the distinction between positive and negative liberty, Frankfurt School psychoanalyst and humanistic philosopher Erich Fromm drew a similar distinction between negative and positive freedom.

The positive notion of liberty plays a crucial, yet almost always implicit, role in many major political philosophies, such as direct democracy, socialism, and communism. In contrast to negative liberty, which in its largest scope applies to individuals, positive liberty has often been applied by collectivist philosophies to whole segments of society or to a nation’s society as a whole. Positive freedom is often described as personal ability to achieve certain ends, while negative freedom is described as freedom from being forcibly prevented from achieving those ends. Put in the simplest terms, one might say that a democratic society is a free society because it is a self-determined society, and that a member of that society is free to the extent that he or she participates in its democratic process. But there are also individualist applications of the concept of positive freedom. For example, it is sometimes said that a government should aim actively to create the conditions necessary for individuals to be self-sufficient or to achieve self-realization.

In this sense, positive liberty is the adherence to an agreed upon set of rules formulated by all parties involved. Should the rules be altered, all parties involved must agree upon the changes. However, Berlin opposed any suggestion that paternalism and positive liberty could be equivalent. He stated that positive liberty could only apply when the withdrawal of liberty from an individual was in pursuit of a choice that individual himself/herself made, not a general principle of society or any other person’s opinion. In the case where a person removes a driver’s car keys against their will because they have had too much to drink, this constitutes positive freedom only if the driver has made, of their own free will, an earlier decision not to drive drunk.

Thus, by removing the keys, the other person facilitates this decision and ensures that it will be upheld in the face of paradoxical behaviour (ie, drinking) by the driver. For the remover to remove the keys in the absence of such an expressed intent by the driver, because the remover feels that the driver ought not to drive drunk, is paternalism, and not positive freedom by Berlin’s definition. Fromm sees the distinction between the two types of freedom emerging alongside humanity’s evolution away from the instinctual activity that characterizes lower animal forms. This aspect of freedom, he argues, “is here used not in its positive sense of ‘freedom to’ but in its negative sense of ‘freedom from’, namely freedom from instinctual determination of his actions.”

For Fromm, freedom from animal instinct implicitly implies that survival now hinges on the necessity of charting one’s own course. He relates this distinction to the biblical story of man’s expulsion from Eden. Positive freedom comes through the actualization of individuality in balance with the separation from the whole; solidarity with all men”, united not by instinctual or predetermined ties, but on the basis of a freedom founded on reason. The idea of positive liberty is often emphasized by those on the left-wing of the political spectrum, whereas negative liberty is most important for those who lean towards the right, such as classical liberals. However, not all on either the left or right would accept the positive/negative liberty distinction as genuine or significant. For example, Gerald MacCallum believes Berlin is in error and that, “Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something” and that what Berlin is referring to as freedom is not freedom at all.

Some conservatives also embrace some forms of positive liberty. For example, (though the labels conservative, liberal, left, and right are anachronistic to them) Christian Puritans such as Cotton Mather, who often referred to liberty in their writings, tended to focus on the freedom from sin even at the expense of liberty from government sanction. So, for the Puritans, who considered society and society’s government to be practically indistinguishable, the idea of modesty mores being societal enforced was an idea that supported and enhanced community liberty. Such communitarian liberty or freedom is not liberty that those that are called individualist or libertarian would recognize; it is positive liberty. Many anarchists, and others considered to be on the left-wing, see the two concepts of positive and negative freedom as interdependent and thus inseparable; contrarily, those in the right-libertarian camp assert that the provision of positive liberty to one requires the abridgment of the negative liberty of another.

Answer : Mill’s in his book ‘On Liberty’ addresses the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. One argument that Mill develops further than any previous philosopher is the harm principle. The harm principle holds that each individual has the right to act as he wants, so long as these actions do not harm others. If the action is self-regarding, that is, if it only directly affects the person undertaking the action, then society has no right to intervene, even if it feels the actor is harming himself. Mill excuses those who are “incapable of self-government” from this principle, such as young children or those living in “backward states of society”.

It is important to emphasize that Mill did not consider giving offense to constitute “harm”; an action could not be restricted because it violated the conventions or morals of a given society. Mill emphasizes an impassioned defense of free speech. Mill argues that free discourse is a necessary condition for intellectual and social progress. We can never be sure, he contends, that a silenced opinion does not contain some element of the truth. He also argues that allowing people to air false opinions is productive for two reasons. First, individuals are more likely to abandon erroneous beliefs if they are engaged in an open exchange of ideas. Second, by forcing other individuals to re-examine and re-affirm their beliefs in the process of debate, these beliefs are kept from declining into mere dogma.

It is not enough for Mill that one simply has an unexamined belief that happens to be true; one must understand why the belief in question is the true one. Though this principle seems clear, there are a number of complications. For example, Mill explicitly states that “harms” may include acts of omission as well as acts of commission. Thus, failing to rescue a drowning child counts as a harmful act, as does failing to pay taxes, or failing to appear as a witness in court. All such harmful omissions may be regulated, according to Mill. By contrast, it does not count as harming someone if without force or fraud, the affected individual consents to assume the risk: thus one may permissibly offer unsafe employment to others, provided there is no deception involved. In these and other cases, it is important to keep in mind that his arguments are grounded on the principle of Utility, and not on appeals to natural rights.

Mill believes that “the struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history.” By liberty, he meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers” and he calls it “social liberty.” He introduces different tyrannies such as social tyranny, and the tyranny of the majority. Social Liberty for Mill was to put limits on the ruler’s power so that he would not be able to use his power on his own wishes and make every kind of decision which could harm society; in other words, people should have the right to a say in the government’s decisions. He said that social liberty was “the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual”. It was attempted in two ways: first, by obtaining recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights; second, by establishment of a system of “constitutional checks”. However, limiting the power of government is not enough. Society can and does execute its own mandates.

Answer : The notion of justice is very much associated with liberty and equality and the way it is available to a person in a society. The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.

Secondly, offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Justice is action in accordance with the requirements of some law. Whether these rules are grounded in human consensus or societal norms, they are supposed to ensure that all members of society receive fair treatment. Issues of justice arise in several different spheres and play a significant role in causing, perpetuating, and addressing conflict. Just institutions tend to instill a sense of stability, well-being, and satisfaction among society members, while perceived injustices can lead to dissatisfaction, rebellion, or revolution. Each of the different spheres expresses the principles of justice and fairness in its own way, resulting in different types and concepts of justice: distributive, procedural, retributive, and restorative.

These types of justice have important implications for socio-economic, political, civil, and criminal justice at both the national and international level.Distributive justice, or economic justice, is concerned with giving all members of society a “fair share” of the benefits and resources available. However, while everyone might agree that wealth should be distributed fairly, there is much disagreement about what counts as a “fair share.” Some possible criteria of distribution are equity, equality, and need. (Equity means that one’s rewards should be equal to one’s contributions to a society, while “equality” means that everyone gets the same amount, regardless of their input. Distribution on the basis of need means that people who need more will get more, while people who need less will get less.) Fair allocation of resources, or distributive justice, is crucial to the stability of a society and the well-being of its members. When issues of distributive justice are inadequately addressed and the item to be distributed is highly valued, intractable conflicts frequently result.Procedural justice is concerned with making and implementing decisions according to fair processes that ensure “fair treatment.”

Rules must be impartially followed and consistently applied in order to generate an unbiased decision. Those carrying out the procedures should be neutral, and those directly affected by the decisions should have some voice or representation in the decision-making process. If people believe procedures to be fair, they will be more likely to accept outcomes, even ones that they do not like. Implementing fair procedures is central to many dispute resolution procedures, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. Retributive justice appeals to the notion of “just dessert” — the idea that people deserve to be treated in the same way they treat others. It is a retroactive approach that justifies punishment as a response to past injustice or wrongdoing. The central idea is that the offender has gained unfair advantages through his or her behavior, and that punishment will set this imbalance straight. In other words, those who do not play by the rules should be brought to justice and deserve to suffer penalties for their transgressions.

Retributive justice plays a central role in legal proceedings, responding to violations of international law and human rights, and war crimes adjudication. However, because there is a tendency to slip from retributive justice to an emphasis on revenge, some suggest that restorative justice processes are more effective. While a retributive justice approach conceives of transgressions as crimes against the state or nation, restorative justice focuses on violations as crimes against individuals. It is concerned with healing victims’ wounds, restoring offenders to law-abiding lives, and repairing harm done to interpersonal relationships and the community. Victims take an active role in directing the exchange that takes place, as well as defining the responsibilities and obligations of offenders. Offenders are encouraged to understand the harm they have caused their victims and take responsibility for it.

Restorative justice aims to strengthen the community and prevent similar harms from happening in the future. At the national level, such processes are often carried out through victim-offender mediation programs, while at the international level restorative justice is often a matter of instituting truth and reconciliation commissions.

Answer : Liberty is the freedom to act or believe without being stopped by unnecessary force. In modern time, is generally considered a concept of political philosophy and identifies the condition in which an individual has the ability to act according to his or her own will. Opinions on what constitute liberty can vary widely, but can be generally classified as positive liberty and negative liberty. Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative liberty to the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense. Positive liberty is the possibility of acting or the fact of acting in such a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental purposes. While negative liberty is usually attributed to individual agents, positive liberty is sometimes attributed to collectivities, or to individuals considered primarily as members of given collectivities.

The idea of distinguishing between a negative and a positive sense of the term ‘liberty’ goes back at least to Kant, and was examined and defended in depth by Isaiah Berlin in the 1950s and ’60s. Discussions about positive and negative liberty normally take place within the context of political and social philosophy. They are distinct from, though sometimes related to, philosophical discussions about free will. Work on the nature of positive liberty often overlaps, however, with work on the nature of autonomy. As Berlin showed, negative and positive liberty is not merely two distinct kinds of liberty; they can be seen as rival, incompatible interpretations of a single political ideal. Since few people claim to be against liberty, the way this term is interpreted and defined can have important political implications. Political liberalism tends to presuppose a negative definition of liberty: liberals generally claim that if one favors individual liberty one should place strong limitations on the activities of the state.

Critics of liberalism often contest this implication by contesting the negative definition of liberty: they argue that the pursuit of liberty understood as self-realization or as self-determination (whether of the individual or of the collectivity) can require state intervention of a kind not normally allowed by liberals. Many authors prefer to talk of positive and negative freedom. This is only a difference of style, and the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ can be used interchangeably. Although some attempts have been made to distinguish between liberty and freedom, these have not caught on. Neither can they be translated into other European languages, which contain only the one term, of either Latin or Germanic origin where English contains both.

Answer : Constitutionalism is the idea, often associated with the political theories of John Locke and the “founders” of the American republic, that government can and should be legally limited in its powers, and that its authority depends on its observing these limitations. This idea brings with it a host of vexing questions of interest not only to legal scholars, but to anyone keen to explore the legal and philosophical foundations of the state. How can a government be legally limited if law is the creation of government? Does this mean that a government can be “self-limiting,” or is there some way of avoiding this implication? If meaningful limitation is to be possible, must constitutional constraints be somehow “entrenched”? Must they be enshrined in written rules? If so, how are they to be interpreted? In terms of literal meaning or the intentions of their authors, or in terms of the, possibly ever-changing, values they express? How one answers these questions depends crucially on how one conceives the nature, identity and authority of constitutions. Does a constitution establish a stable framework for the exercise of public power which is in some way fixed by factors like the original meaning or intentions? Or is it a “living tree” which grows and develops in tandem with changing political values and principles?

In some minimal sense of the term, a “constitution” consists of a set of rules or norms creating, structuring and defining the limits of, government power or authority. Understood in this way, all states have constitutions and all states are constitutional states. Anything recognizable as a state must have some acknowledged means of constituting and specifying the limits (or lack thereof) placed upon the three basic forms of government power: legislative power (making new laws), executive power (implementing laws) and judicial power (adjudicating disputes under laws). Take the extreme case of an absolute monarch, Rex, who combines unlimited power in all three domains. If it is widely acknowledged that Rex has these powers, as well as the authority to exercise them at his pleasure, then the constitution of this state could be said to contain only one rule, which grants unlimited power to Rex. He is not legally answerable for the wisdom or morality of his decrees, nor is he bound by procedures, or any other kinds of limitations or requirements, in exercising his powers. Whatever he decrees is constitutionally valid.

When scholars talk of constitutionalism, however, they normally mean something that rules out Rex’s case. They mean not only that there are rules creating legislative, executive and judicial powers, but that these rules impose limits on those powers. Often these limitations are in the form of individual or group rights against government, rights to things like free expression, association, equality and due process of law. But constitutional limits come in a variety of forms. They can concern such things as the scope of authority (e.g., in a federal system, provincial or state governments may have authority over health care and education while the federal government’s jurisdiction extends to national defence and transportation); the mechanisms used in exercising the relevant power (e.g., procedural requirements governing the form and manner of legislation); and of course civil rights (e.g., in a Charter or Bill of Rights). Constitutionalism in this richer sense of the term is the idea that government can/should be limited in its powers and that its authority depends on its observing these limitations. Thus when a radical change is brought through valid means t curb anarchy may be termed revolution and that can always be done.