Question : Different versions of ontological argument and Kant’s critique of this argument.
(2008)
Answer : The ontological argument can accurately be summarized in standard form:
Intuitively, one can think of the argument as being powered by two ideas. The first, expressed by Premise 2, is that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates all of the perfections. Otherwise put, Premise 2 asserts that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates every property that makes a being greater, other things being equal, than it would have been without that property (such properties are also known as “great-making” properties).
Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection or great-making property. Immanuel Kant directed his famous objection at premise 3’s claim that a being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind. According to premise 3, existence is what’s known as a great-making property or, as the matter is sometimes put, perfection. Premise 3 thus entails that (1) existence is a property; and (2) instantiating existence makes a thing better, other things being equal, than it would have been otherwise. Kant rejects premise 3 on the ground that, as a purely formal matter, existence does not function as a predicate.
Kant puts the point: Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or content; the word is, is no additional predicate-it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God is, or There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates - I posit the object in relation to my conception.
Accordingly, what goes wrong with the first version of the ontological argument is that the notion of existence is being treated as the wrong logical type. Concepts, as a logical matter, are defined entirely in terms of logical predicates. Since existence isn’t a logical predicate, it doesn’t belong to the concept of God; it rather affirms that the existence of something that satisfies the predicates defining the concept of God.Question : Can Deism be a satisfactory theory in the context of God of grace and devotion? Discuss.
(2008)
Answer : Deism is the belief in a supreme being, who remains unknowable and untouchable. God is viewed as merely the “first cause” and underlying principle of rationality in the universe. Deists believe in a god of nature, a noninterventionist creator who permits the universe to run itself according to natural laws. Like a “clockmaker god” initiating the cosmic process, the universe moves forward, without needing God’s supervision. Deism believes that precise and unvarying laws define the universe as self-operating and self-explanatory. These laws reveal themselves through “the light of reason and nature.” Reliance on the power of reasoning exchanges faith for human logic. Here are some examples of deist reasoning:
God is identified through nature and reason, not revelation. Deists, who believe in God, or at least a divine principle, follow few if any of the other tenets and practices of Christianity, Judaism, or any religion believing in a personal God. Any deist god is an eternal entity whose power is equal to his/her will.
Some deists believe in Jesus Christ, while others do not. Most deists give regard to the moral teachings of Jesus.
Deism has no creed, articles of faith, or holy book. Neither Satan nor hell exists, only symbols of evil which can be overcome by man’s own reasoning.
Man is qualified to decide what reasonable path to follow regarding morals. Deists refer to themselves as “freethinkers.”
Deists reject revelations and visions. There is no place for the nonsense of miracles and prophecies in an enlightened deist’s life.
Deism has no need for ministers, priests, or rabbis. All an individual requires is their own common sense and the ability to contemplate their human condition.
Since the latter part of the 18th century, deism used science to justify its stance. Scientists, like Sir Isaac Newton, were able to elaborate more and more to explain how the universe and everything around us worked. Many of the mysteries that man attributed to God yielded simple mechanistic explanations. The increase in knowledge spurred the decline in religious faith among the intellectual elite. As a philosopher and mathematician, Descartes reduced God to a “mathematical abstraction.” Reason pushed faith off into the realm of mythology and superstition, while deism quickly deteriorated into atheism (belief in no God at all). Science seemed to engage in a centuries-old battle with religion for the mind of man. Life became a product of blind change — a cosmic game of chance played throughout time.Question : The difference between Impersonalistic and Naturalistic notion of God.
(2006)
Answer : The notion of God has changed with time. It all depends on how we perceive the concept of God. First of all the naturalistic concept of God came in existence. It was quite natural as men of the primitive age were not able to understand the natural phenomena and so they tried to personify the natural things around them. That is why naturalistic notion of god represents the first stage of the evolution of the concept of God. On the other hand with the passage of time the analytical ability of men developed and they could now analyze the things around them in a more refined manner. This resulted in the Impersonalistic notion of God. The naturalistic notion represents God as a gross element. In this notion natural things are revered and feared also. We can see naturalistic notion of God in almost all primitive societies.
The basic cause of this notion is fear and gratitude towards the unknown natural phenomena. But the basic reason behind the impersonalistic notion of God is that is opposed to the personalistic concept of divine power. In other words the supporters of impersonalistic notion believe that personalistic notion of God would limit the omniscience of God and it would spoil the real spirit of divine power which is ultimate in every aspect. In Indian philosophy Shankar is the main proponent of impersonalistic notion of God. In the western philosophy Spinoza advocates for the impersonal god when he says God is all and all is God. But impersonalistic concept of God is not acceptable to the theists as it fail to satisfy their religious spirit and emotions which is not the case with naturalistic notion of god.
Question : Traditionally omnipotence has been regarded as one of the attributes of god. But according to some critics, the notion of omnipotence being is paradoxical. In response, some theists have tried to resolve the alleged paradox. Describe the paradox and explain the attempts to resolve it.
(2006)
Answer : Between people of different faiths, or indeed between people of the same faith, the term omnipotent has been used to connote a number of different positions. These positions include, but are not limited to, the following:
A deity is able to do anything that is logically possible for it to do
A deity is able to do anything that it chooses to do
A deity is able to do anything that is in accord with its own nature (thus, for instance, if it is a logical consequence of a deity’s nature that what it speaks is truth, then it is not able to lie)
It is part of a deity’s nature to be consistent and that it would be inconsistent for said deity to go against its own laws unless there was a reason to do so.[3]
A deity is able to do anything that corresponds with its omniscience and therefore with its world plan
A deity is able to do absolutely anything, even the logically impossible.
Under many philosophical definitions of the term “deity”, senses 2, 3 and 4 can be shown to be equivalent. However, on all understandings of omnipotence, it is generally held that a deity is able to intervene in the world by superseding the laws of physics, since they are not part of its nature, but the principles on which it has created the physical world. However many modern scholars hold that it is part of a deity’s nature to be consistent and that it would be inconsistent for a deity to go against its own laws unless there were an overwhelming reason to do so. Thomas Aquinas acknowledged difficulty in comprehending a deity’s power. Aquinas said that while “all confess that God is omnipotent, it seems difficult to explain in what God’s omnipotence precisely consists.” In the scholastic understanding, omnipotence is generally understood to be compatible with certain limitations upon a deity’s power, as opposed to implying infinite abilities. There are certain things that even an omnipotent deity cannot do. In response to questions of a deity performing impossibilities (such as making square circles) Aquinas says that “Nothing which implies contradiction falls under the omnipotence of God.” In recent times, C. S. Lewis has adopted a scholastic position in the course of his work The Problem of Pain. Lewis follows Aquinas’ view on contradiction:
His Omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. If you choose to say ‘God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,’ you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the two other words ‘God can.’ It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of his creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because his power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God. Some monotheists reject the view that a deity is or could be omnipotent, or take the view that, by choosing to create creatures with freewill, a deity has chosen to limit divine omnipotence. The rejection of omnipotence often follows from either philosophical or scriptural considerations. Process theology rejects unlimited omnipotence on a philosophical basis, arguing that omnipotence as classically understood would be less than perfect, and is therefore incompatible with the idea of a perfect deity. The idea is grounded in Plato’s oft-overlooked statement that “Being is power.” Anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, has real existence; and so the definition of being is simply power. The argument can be stated as follows:
If a being exists, then it must have some active tendency
If a being has some active tendency, then it has some power to resist its creator
If a being has the power to resist its creator, then the creator does not have absolute power
Power can only be said to be great if it is over something that has defenses and its own agenda. If a deity’s power is to be great, it must therefore be over beings that have at last some of their own defenses and agenda. Thus, if a deity does not have absolute power, it must therefore embody some of the characteristics of power, and some of the characteristics of persuasion. This view is known as dipolar theism.
On scriptural grounds, it is argued, there is no scriptural reason to adhere to omnipotence, and the adoption of the doctrine is merely a result of the synthesis of Hellenic and early Christian thought. However, it could further be argued that the ability to conflict with truth is not an appropriate representation of accepted definitions of power, which negates the assertion that a deity does not have infinite powers. Belief that a deity can do absolutely anything can be thought to yield certain logical paradoxes. A simple example goes as follows: Can a deity create a rock so heavy that even the deity itself cannot lift it? If so, then the rock can’t be lifted, limiting the deity’s power. But if not, then the deity is still not omnipotent. This question cannot be answered using formal logic due to its self-referential nature.
Combining omnipotence with omniscience can yield the difficulty of whether or not a deity can pose a question to which the deity would not know the answer. Augustine, in his City of God, argued that a deity could not do anything that would make it non-omnipotent. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent. Thus Augustine argued that a deity could not do anything or create any situation that would in effect limit the omnipotence of it.
Others have argued that when talking about omnipotence, referencing “a rock so heavy that a deity cannot lift it” is nonsense just as much as referencing “a square circle.” So asking “Can a deity create a rock so heavy that even he cannot lift it?” is just as much nonsense as asking “Can a deity draw a square circle?” Therefore the question (and therefore the perceived paradox) is meaningless. Another such response is that by definition an omnipotent being is set free from the grip of what is logically possible. An omnipotent being therefore would not be subject to what is logically possible. In this sense, an omnipotent being could create a rock that even it could not lift, then lift it. An omnipotent being could also not exist and exist at the same time at any time. A being with knowledge of the concept of omnipotence could then see that omnipotence is by no way limited by logic.
Furthermore arguments in relation to a deity as a creator have been made that a creator of logic itself would not be subject to its creation and thus again could create a rock that even itself could not lift, then lift it. All the above stated claims of power are each based on scriptural grounds and upon empirical human perception. This perception is limited to our senses. There are however other ways of perception like: reason, intuition, revelation, divine inspiration, religious experience, mystical states, and historical testimony. According to the Hindu philosophy the essence of God or Brahman can never be understood or known since Brahman is beyond both existence and non-existence, transcending and including time, causation and space, and thus can never be known in the same material sense as one traditionally ‘understands’ a given concept or object. So presuming there is a god-like entity consciously taking actions, we cannot comprehend the limits of a deity’s powers. Also trying to develop a theory to explain, assign or reject omnipotence on grounds of logic has little merit, since being omnipotent would mean the omnipotent being is above logic.
Question : “If god is omniscient, then humans are not free.”
(2004)
Answer : Omniscience is the capacity to know everything infinitely, or at least everything that can be known about a character including thoughts, feelings, life and the universe, etc. In monotheism, this ability is typically attributed to God. Omniscient is of two types called inherent and total omniscience. Inherent omniscience is the ability to know anything that one chooses to know and can be known whereas means total omniscience, actually knowing everything that can be known. Some modern theologians argue that God’s omniscience is inherent rather than total, and that God chooses to limit his omniscience in order to preserve the freewill and dignity of his creatures. Certain theologians of the 16th Century, comfortable with the definition of God as being omniscient in the total sense, in order for worthy beings’ abilities to choose freely, embraced the doctrine of predestination. Foreknowledge and its compatibility with free will has been a debated topic by theists and philosophers.
The argument that divine foreknowledge is not compatible with free will is known as theological fatalism. If man is truly free to choose between different alternatives, it is very difficult to understand how God could know in advance which way he will choose. Various responses have been proposed. God can know in advance what we will do, because free will is to be understood only as freedom from coercion, and anything further is an illusion. God can know in advance what we will do, even though free will in the fullest sense of the phrase does exist. God somehow has a “middle knowledge” - that is, knowledge of how free agents will act in any given circumstances. God can know all possibilities.
The sovereignty (autonomy) of God, existing within a free agent, provides strong inner compulsions toward a course of action (calling), and the power of choice (election). The actions of a human are thus determined by a human acting on relatively strong or weak urges (both from God and the environment around them) and their own relative power to choose. God chooses to foreknow and foreordain (and, therefore, predetermine) some things, but not others. This allows a free moral choice on the part of man for those things that God choose not to foreordain. It accomplishes this by attributing to God the ability for Him, Himself, to be a free moral agent with the ability to choose what He will, and will not, foreknow, assuming God exists in linear time (or at least an analogue thereof) where “foreknowledge” is a meaningful concept.
It is not possible for God to know the result of a free human choice. Omniscience should therefore be interpreted to mean “knowledge of everything that can be known”. God can know what someone will do, but only by predetermining it; thus, he chooses the extent of human freedom by choosing what (if anything) to know in this way.
Question : What do immanence and transcendence mean in talking about God? Is God really immanent or transcendent?
(2003)
Answer : Many things have been said about God. Immanence and transcendence are the more common attributes of God assumed by most of the theist philosophers. But the characteristics of transcendence and immanence appear to be in conflict. A transcendent God is one who is beyond perception, independent of the universe, and wholly “other” when compared to us. An immanent God, is one which exists within us, within the universe, etc. — and, hence, very much a part of our existence. How can these qualities exist simultaneously? The idea of a transcendent God has roots both in Judaism and in Neo-Platonism. Neo-Platonist philosophy emphasizes the idea that God is so pure and perfect. It completely transcends all of our categories, ideas, and concepts. The idea of an immanent God can also be traced to both Judaism and Greek philosophers. The idea of God being transcendent is very common when it comes to the mystical traditions within various religions. Mystics who seek a union or at least contact with God are seeking a transcendent God — a God so totally “other” and so totally different from what we normally experience that a special mode of experience and perception is required. Such a God is not immanent in our normal lives, otherwise mystical training and mystical experiences would not be necessary to learn about God. In fact, the mystical experiences are themselves generally described as “transcendent” and not amenable to the normal categories of thought and language which would allow those experiences to be communicated to others. Clearly there is some conflict between these two characteristics. The more God’s transcendence is emphasized the less God’s immanence can be understood and vice-versa. For this reason, many philosophers have tried to downplay or even deny one attribute or the other. Kierkegaard, for example, focused primarily upon God’s transcendence and rejected God’s immanence — this has been a common position for many modern theologians.
Moving in the other direction we find Protestant theologian Paul Tillich and those who have followed his example in describing God as our “ultimate concern,” such that we could not “know” God without “participating in” God. This is a very immanent God whose transcendence is ignored entirely — if, indeed, such a God can be described as transcendent at all. The need for both qualities can be seen in the other characteristics normally attributed to God. If God is a person and works within human history, it would make little sense for us not to be able to perceive and communicate with God. Moreover, if God is infinite, then God must exist everywhere — including within us and within the universe. Such a God must be imminent. On the other hand, if God is absolutely perfect beyond all experience and understanding, then God must also be transcendent. If God is timeless (outside of time and space) and unchangeable, then God cannot also be imminent within us, beings who are within time. Such a God must be wholly “other,” transcendent to everything we know. Because both of these qualities follow readily from other qualities, it would be very difficult to abandon either without also needing to abandon or at least seriously modify many other common attributes of God. Some theologians and philosophers have been willing to make such a move, but most have not - and the result is a continuation of both of these attributes, constantly in tension.
Question : Impersonalistic notion of God.
(2002)
Answer : It represents the rational and logical thinking of human beings towards the concept of god. In other words it is the logical conclusion of the development and evolution of the notions of God. The naturalistic notion of God proceeds towards the impersonalistic notion of God when people thought of it in more rational and logical way. In this notion God is considered to be quality less. Here qualities does not mean that God is without quality. Rather it refers to the fact that the qualities in god are countless and beyond the perception of human beings as they have their own limit as compared to God. Among western philosophers, thinkers such as Bradley, T. H. Green and some other idealist like Spinoza are the main proponents of impersonalistic notion of God. In Indian philosophy Shankar advocates for the nirguna Brahama that is similar to the impersonalistic notion of God. The impersonalistic notion of God leads to pantheism. Pan theism is the concept given by Spinoza which says that All is God and god is All.
Thus here it does not distinguish between divine and worldly things. Hence it is vehemently criticized by the votaries of theists. It is because impersonalistic notion of God is does not suit the sentiments of the religious people who always distinguish between the earthy and transcendental things. But the best part of this notion is that it represents all the three basic elements of religion which are knowledge, action and faith. Hence from the logical point of view the basis of the notion is more acceptable on philosophical grounds. People of different streams find their solace in this notion. Bit religious people always prefer to adhere to the notion of personalistic concept of god.
Question : Naturalistic notion of God.
(1999)
Answer : As and when we start thinking about the divine power from religious point of view, it results in a debate centered on the basic nature of God. There are three notions of God widely accepted by the philosophers and thinkers. Out of three one is naturalistic notion of God. In this notion God is not more than a gross element. Naturalistic notion represents the first stage of the evolution of the notion of God. In this notion nature is considered to have the divine power. In other words the natural objects like hill, tree, and rain are invested with magical and ultimate powers.
These things are revered and admired. but the main reason behind this notion is the inability of the human beings to understand the natural phenomena. That is why these phenomena are feared and admired also. There is rationality behind this notion of God except some kind of belief that devotion to these natural objects would help escape the wrath of God. Moreover the naturalistic notion of God should not be confused with the naturalism. Naturalism is completely based on reason and logic and there is place of god in the naturalism. The naturalistic notion of god can easily noticed even today among the tribal societies. Most of the present tribal believe in this notion which is quite evident in the Totemism and Taboo prevalent among these tribal.
Question : Difference between Theology and philosophy of Religion.
(1996)
Answer : Sometimes confused with theology, the Philosophy of Religion is the philosophical study of religious beliefs, religious doctrines, religious arguments and religious history. The line between theology and the philosophy of religion isn’t always sharp because they share so much in common, but the primary difference is that theology tends to be apologetic in nature, committed to the defense of particular religious positions.
Theology is the study of the existence or attributes of a god or gods, or more generally the study of religion or spirituality. It is sometimes contrasted with religious studies: theology is understood as the study of religion from an internal perspective (e.g., a perspective of commitment to that religion), and religious studies as the study of religion from an external (e.g., a secular) perspective. Theologians use various forms of analysis and argument (philosophical, ethnographic, historical, and others) to help understand, explain, test, critique, defend or promote any of myriad religious topics. It might be undertaken to help the theologian: understand more truly his or her own religious tradition, understand more truly another religious tradition, make comparisons between religious traditions, defend or justify a religious tradition, facilitate reform of a particular tradition, assist in the propagation of a religious tradition, or draw on the resources of a tradition to address some present situation or need, among other things.
Philosophy of religion on the other hand has no biasness towards a particular religion. It does not promote or degrade ant religion. It simply goes in to the detail of every aspect of the religion itself and in that way it is neutral by nature. It draws a conclusion based on the facts available to it and that may be accepted by all the religious sects. It provides a platform where there may be a negotiation possible between all the religions. This is why the scope and area of study of philosophy is larger than that of theology. It clearly shows that the philosophy of religion is based on reason whereas the theology is based on faith to a greater extent.
