Miscellaneous

Answer : Kant has stated that reading David Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumber. It was Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding that made Kant aware of issues and prejudices in his life that he had previously been unaware of. This further prompted Kant to respond to Hume with his own analysis on the theory of metaphysics. Kant did not feel that Hume dealt with these matters adequately and resolved to pick up where Hume had left off, specifically addressing the question of whether metaphysics as a science is possible. Hume basically asserted in his writings that metaphysics, as a science, is not possible. He specifically drew on the theory of “causality”, which is the attempt by people to rationalize situations. These rationalizations deal with the experience of cause and effect. People tend to attribute patterns to things according to their cause and effect. For example, gravity causes the anything that goes up to come down- we have become so used to this principle that we have made a very definitive statement on the subject. Hume however, attacks this principle by claiming that we have not experienced every instance of this matter.

Copernicus saw that the movement should not be placed in us, but in something else. For us to go beyond our limits of thinking and to get passed spatial and temporal terms is not possible. Applications of all his theories- such as phenomena, spatial and temporal origins led him Kant think that this type of metaphysics, despite what Hume believed, is possible. Hume’s writing posed an interesting starting off point for Kant’s theories. It is almost as if he is not making a definitive statement on the existence of metaphysics. Finally, Kant reaches the conclusion that certain types of metaphysics are possible, while others are not. He now takes what he calls the Copernican turn. He identifies this with his theories of phenomena and noumena.

Like Copernicus, Kant felt that we should try to remove ourselves and our influence from the explanation of metaphysics. He questions whether we are innately prone to see things in a certain way. The basic question that Hume brings up and tries to answer is whether metaphysics is possible as a science- or to put it another way, are synthetic judgments possible a priori. Kant directly deals with the problems presented in Hume’s analysis of metaphysics. Kant could not explain metaphysics on a transcendent level, so he simply turned to faith to justify the existence of it.

Answer : According to Leibniz the monad, here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up compounds; by simple, we mean without parts. There must be simple substances because there are compound substances; for the compound is nothing else than a collection of simple substances. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in a word, the elements of things. Their dissolution, therefore, is not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it can not be formed by composition.

We may say then, that the existence of monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Compounds, however, begin or end by parts. There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility of transposition within it, nor can we conceive of any internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or diminished within it, such as can take place in the case of compounds where a change can occur among the parts. The monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out. The Attributes cannot detach themselves or go forth from the substances, as could sensible species of the Schoolmen.

In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a monad. Still monads need to have some qualities; otherwise they would not even be existences. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no means of perceiving any change in things. Whatever is in a compound can come into it only through its simple elements and the monads, if they were without qualities (since they do not differ at all in quantity) would be indistinguishable one from another. For instance, if we imagine a plenum or completely filled space, where each part receives only the equivalent of its own previous motion, one state of things would not be distinguishable from another. Each monad, indeed, must be different from every other monad. For, there are never in nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it is not possible to find a difference either internal or based on an intrinsic property. It is admitted that every created being, and consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continuous in each. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence on its inner being.

Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the monad a variety which changes. This variety constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances. This variety must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in that which is simple. For, since every natural change takes place by degrees, there must be something which changes and something which remains unchanged, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts. The passing condition which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called perception. This should be carefully distinguished from apperception or consciousness, as will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they deny the existence of those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are monads and that there are no souls of animals or other entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of unconsciousness and actual death. They have thus adopted the Scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal.

The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another may be called appetition. It is true that the desire is not always able to attain to the whole of the perception which it strives for, but it always attains a portion of it and reaches new perceptions. But the same can’t be said about Strawson’s concept of basic particulars. Strawson entitled “Particulars,” Strawson dealt with the identification of particular objects. Here, he held that material objects are the basic particulars, the foundation of identification of particular things. So, he claimed, a publicly observable system of enduring entities that are situated in space and time is the general condition required for identification, and the material universe provides this. In his thesis, Strawson attacked the Cartesian view that consciousness attaches to mental substances, and also the modern view that states of consciousness do not attach to anything at all. He proposed, instead, that consciousness is a primitive concept such that states of consciousness and physical properties can and are both ascribed to persons.

Answer : It is a very common allegation against Indian philosophy that God is the main scheme of theme of the Indian philosophical thoughts since its beginning. It is the pivot around which the whole philosophical thought in India found its expression. To some extent this allegation seems natural and contextual also. In reality the philosophy and religion in India are interlinked and it is very difficult to separate one from the other. Therefore the general impression it evokes is that Indian philosophy is purely theistic. The statement holds ground apparently but a deep analysis of the different schools of thought in Indian philosophy reveals something else, quite contrary to the common misconception said above.

Freedom of expression and therefore different streams of thought have been the very basis of the Indian philosophy since its evolution. It has touched almost all the aspects of human feelings and thoughts be it God, or no-God concepts. Sometimes two completely opposite schools of thought developed side by side on the Indian soil and both flourished together despite their opposite convictions.

In general we can see two main streams of thought in Indian philosophy, theistic and atheistic schools of thought. Among the theistic schools Nyaya-Vaishesika school is quite familiar to us. In the Nyaya philosophy God is the sole creatar of the Veda scripture. The validity of the Veda is certain as it is the creation of God. This very idea substantiates the fact that the existence of god is unchallenged as per the Nyaya philosophy. In addition to it, God is the creator of this universe. In Vaishesika philosophy also God is the sole regulator of the ethics and morality in this world. He is also the creator of this world (samsar). According to vaisherika it is the god, who under the guidance of Adrsta, ensures the fruits of the Karmas done by the human beings. Yoga Darshan too, is theistic in nature. In yoga schools of thought two different reasons necessitate the existence of the God; first as a creator of this universe and secondary for the validation of the God.

Vedanta too does believe in God. God is the other name of Brahman in Vedanta philosophy. God in Vedanta is the empirical form of the transecendental Brahma. He is the creator of this universe. In Ramanuja philosophy God and Brahman is one and the same unlike Shankar’s Vedanta.

Hence there is no dearth of atheistic schools of thought in Indian philosophy. The Charvaka philosophy out rightly rejects the concept of God. Perception is the only valid means of knowledge and since the so called God is transcendental, there is no reason to believe that there is anything like god that really exists, Charvak asserts. The Buddhist philosophy is not very different from its atheist brethren. It is also a non believer. The whole emphasis in the Buddhist school of thought is on the four noble truths. For God, there is no place in the Buddhist philosophy. Jainism follows the same path. For them the Mahavir, the most important exponent of the Jainism is the real God for Jains. But later on, followers of Jainism developed the concept of God in Jainism.

Even Samkhya and Mimamsa are also opposed to the concept of God. Samskhya does not adhere to the notion of God for the purpose of liberation. Mimamsa also says that Veda is eternal and authorless. God is it is not the author of God. It has not been composed or spoken by the God. The Universe is also eternal. This universe is also eternal. It can neither be created nor even destroyed.

Thus it is quite evident that the Indian philosophical thought is partial atheistic and partial theistic. Both these trends can easily be noticed in the Indian philosophy. It can’t be branded solely as atheistic or atheistic.

Answer : Let us first consider the Samkhya theory of causation on which its doctrine of Prakrti is based. The basic question involved in any theory of causation is: Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause? Those who answer this question in the negative are called Asatkaryavadins, while those who answer it in the affirmative are called Satkaryavadins. According to the former, the effect is a new creation, a real beginning. The effect (Karya) does not pre-exist (asat) in is material cause. Otherwise, there would be no sense in saying that it is produced or caused. If the pot already exists in the clay and the cloth in the threads and curd in milk, then why should the potter exert himself in producing the pot out of the clay, and why should not the threads serve the purpose of the cloth and why should not milk taste like curd?

Moreover, its production would be its repeated birth which is nonsense. Nyaya, Vaishesika, Hinayana Buddhism, Materialism and some followers of Mimamsa believe in Asatkaryavada, which is also known as Arambhavada, i.e., the view that production is a new beginning. Materialism believes in Svabhavavada; Hinayana Buddhism in Anitya-paramanuvada or Ksanabhangavada and Nyaya Vaishesika and some followers of Mimamsa in Nitya paramanu karanavada.

The Satkaryavadins, on the other hand, believe that the effect is not a new creation, but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause. Here, another important question arises: Is the effect a real transformation or an unreal appearance of its cause? Those who believe that the effect is a real transformation of its cause are called Parinamavadins (parinanma = real modification); while those who believe that it is an unreal appearance are called Vivartavadins (vivarta = unreal appearance). Samkhya, Yoga and Ramanuja believe in Parinamavada. The view of Samkhya-Yoga is called Prakrti parinama-vada, while the view of Ramanuja is called Brahma parinamavada, Shunyavada, respectively called Shunyata-vivarta-vada, Vijnana-vivarta-vada and Brahma-vivarta-vada. The view of Jainism and of Kumarila may be called Sadasatkaryavada because according to them the effect is both real as well as unreal before its production- real as identical with the cause and unreal as model change thereof, though ultimately both incline towards Parinamavada.

Samkhya believes in Satkaryavada. All material effects are the modification (parinama) of Prakrti. They pre exist in the eternal bosom of Prakrti and simply come out of it as the time of creation and return to it at the time of dissolution. There is neither new production nor utter destruction. Production means development or manifestation (avirbhava); destruction means envelopment or dissolution (tirobhava). Production is evolution; destruction is involution. Samkhya gives five arguments in support of Satkaryavada:

• If the effect does not pre-exist in its cause, it becomes a mere nonentity like the hare’s horn or the sky-flowers and can never be produced (asadakarana).
• The effect is only a manifestation of its material cause, because it is invariably connected with it (upadanagrahanat).
• Everything cannot be produced out of everything. This suggests that the effect, before its manifestation, is implicit in its material cause (sarvasambhavabhavat).
• Only an efficient cause can produce that for which it is potent. This again means that the effect, before its manifestation, is potentially contained in its material cause. Production is only an actualizaion of the potential (shaktasya shakyakaranat). Were it not so, then curd should be produced out of water, and cloth out of reels, and oil out of sand particles.
• The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. When the obstructions in the way of manifestation are removed, the effect naturally flows out of its cause. The cause and the effect are the implicit and the explicit stages of the same process. The cloth is contained in the threads, the oil in the oil-seeds, and the curd in the milk. The effect pre-exists in its material cause (karanabhavavat)

Answer : Views of the various schools of Indian philosophy on the nature of self and its liberation are very much dependent on the nature and concept of self developed in these schools. Let us take the Charvaka school of thought first. In Charvaka school of thought soul and god are rejected. The so called soul is simply the conscious living body. Consciousness is the result of an emergent and dialectical evolution. It is an epiphenomenon, a by product of matters. There cannot be the existence of soul without the body and it ends with the end of the body.

Therefore, as Charavaka says sensual pleasure is the summum bonum of life. There is no other world and the concept of Moksha or liberation should be rejected. But the ethics of Charvaka is a crude individual hedonism. Several and contemptuous criticism has been leveled against this doctrine of Charvaka. This is because man is not merely a biological animal but also a psychological and moral creature, a rational and self conscious person capable of realizing the values. Liberation has always been his prime and highest goal of life.

In the Jainism jiva is generally the same as the Atman or the Pursua of other pluralistic schools. Consciousness is regarded as the essence of the soul. Karma is the link which unites the soul to the body. Ignorance of truth and four passions angles, greed, pride and delusion are called kasaya or sticky substance. Here karmic particles stick. Passions attract the flow of Karmic matter into the souls. And passions are due to ignorance. So Ignorance is the real cause of bondage. Therefore right knowledge is the cause of liberation. In the state of liberation omniscience is attained.

In the Buddhist schools of philosophy the ultimate ideal of the human being is Nirvana. The so called soul is a series of fleeting ideas. Everything is momentary and impermanent. Liberation is the extinction of all derives. The cause of bondage as per Buddhist school of thought is also avidya (ignorance). With the pursuance of eight fold path prescribed by Buddha takes one to the path of liberation or Nrivana. The ideal of Nivana is said to be negative, individual and selfish. It is said to be a negative cessation of all earthly miseries. But some scholars are of opinion that nirvana is the highest bliss as Buddha taught in his preaching. It gives happiness. The next stage of nirvana is called Mahaparinirvana or the death or end of life which really cannot be the cherished goal of an individual.

In Samkhya philosophy purusa is the soul, the sect, the spirit, the subject, the knower. In other words Purusa is free and true consciousness. It is inactive and indifferent. It is only when it mistakes its reflection in the buddhi for itself and identifies itself wrongly with the internal organ, the intellect, the ago and the mind that it is said to be bound. It is the ego that is bound. Hence bondage is due to ignorance or non discrimination between the self and the not self and liberation is due to right knowledge or discrimination between the self and the not self. Samkhya admits both Jivanmukti and videh-mukti. It also believes that bondage and liberation alike are only phenomenal.

The moment right knowledge dawns, the person becomes liberated here and now, even though he may be embodied due to Prarabdha Karma. The final and absolute emancipation, the complete disembodied isolation automatically results after death. Samkhya liberation is a state of complete isolation, freedom from all pain, the return of the purusa to its pure nature as consciousness.

The Nyaya-Vaishesika also regards bondage as due to ignorance and liberation as due to knowledge. The soul due to ignorance performs actions. Actions lead to merits or demerits. They are due to attachment or aversion and aim at obtaining pleasure or avoiding pain. The merits and demerits of the individual souls make up the unseen moral power, the Adrsta, or the deposition of Karmas. To get red of bondage, the soul must stop actions. Liberation comes through knowledge. The soul is separated from the fetters of the mind and the body and realizes its true nature. Thus liberation is the cessation of all life, all consciousness.

In Shankar’s school of thought Atman is the seen as Brahman. It is pure consciousness. It is the self which is self luminous and which transcends the subject object duality and the trinity of knower, know and knowledge. It is the only reality. Shankar repeatedly asserts that the absolute can be realized through knowledge and knowledge; Karma and upasana are subsidiary. Ultimate reality can neither be asserted nor denied by knowledge. Knowledge does nothing else except removing ignorance, the cause of the bondage of an individual. Liberation therefore means removal of ignorance of knowledge. That blessed person who has realized reality is liberated here and now. This is Jivanmukti. Final release is obtained after the death of the body.

According to Ramanuja also the souls are bound an account of their ignorance and Karma and it is the bhakti which makes one realize the truth and liberation. Liberation, according Ramanuja, is not the merging of the individual soul into the absolute, but only the direct intuitive realization by the individual soul of its own essential nature as a mode of god. This realization presupposes two things: firstly, the utter destruction of the Karmas and secondly the dawning of the Divine Grace which transforms constant meditation into the immediate institution of god. Hence there is no Jivanmukti as Shankar says regarding liberation.