Mimamsa

Answer : Anupalabdhi is a proof of knowledge from negation or absence of a thing. Since Brahman is everywhere present and nowhere absent, this proof does not deserve consideration. Anupalabdhi is a proof of knowledge from negation or absence of a thing. In addition to the above pramanas Kumarila admits a fifth kind of pramana, viz. anupalabdhi for the perception of the non-existence of a thing.

Kumarila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumana. They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly the points to be solved.

How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped? It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of pramana namely anupalabdhi. All things exist in places either in a positive (sadrupa) or in a negative relation (asadrupa), and it is only in the former case that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we designate as a separate pramana as anupalabdhi.

Prabhakara holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate pramana as anupalabdhi. For what is meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone we ought not to perceive the non-existence of the jug, inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that which is not associated with the jug, then the category of negation is practically admitted as a separate entity.

If the perception of empty space is defined as the perception of space at the moment which we associated with a want of knowledge about the jug, then also want of knowledge as a separate entity has to be accepted, which amounts to the same thing as the admission of the want or negation of the jug. Whatever attempt may be made to explain the notion of negation by any positive conception, it will at best be an attempt to shift negation from the objective field to knowledge, or in other words to substitute for the place of the external absence of a thing an associated want of knowledge about the thing (in spite of its being a visible object) and this naturally ends in failure, for negation as a separate category has to be admitted either in the field of knowledge or in the external world. Negation or abhava as a separate category has anyhow to be admitted.

Answer : Shabda Pramana has got the greatest importance in Mimamsa. Testimony is verbal authority. It is the knowledge of supra sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumarila divides testimony into personal (pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). The former is the testimony of the Veda (Vedavakya). It is valid in itself. It has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. It may be vitiated by doubt and error and may be contradicted afterwards. The Veda is eternal and authorless. It is not the work of any person, human or divine. The sages are only the seers not the authors of the Veda. The Veda is not composed or spoken even by God. The Veda deals with Dharma and the object denoted by it cannot be known by perception inference, comparison or any other means of valid knowledge. Hence the Vedic injunctions can never be contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. And there can be no internal contradictions in the Veda itself. Hence the Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Prabhakar admits only Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Prabhakar admits only vedic testimony as real testimony and reduces human testimony to inference became its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. Again, testimony may give us knowledge of the existent objects (Siddhartha Vakya) or may command us to do something (Vidhyak Vakya). Kumarila admits the distinction between existential and injunctive propositions and limits the scope of the Veda to the latter (abbihitanyavada). The Veda deals with injunctions.

Prohibitions are injunctions in disguises. Again testimony is verbal cognition and is derived from the meanings of words which compose sentence. To uphold the eternality and the authorless ness of the Veda, the Mimamsaka puts forward the theory that words and meanings as well as their relation are all natural and eternal. A word is made of two or more letters (Varna) and is a mere aggregate of the letters and not a whole (avayavi), though the letters must occur in a particular order. A varna is regarded as an articulated sound. It is eternal (nitya), omnipresent (sarvagata) and integral. It is different from its sound (Dhavni) if it is spoken and also different from its symbolic form (rupa) if it is written. The sound and the form are merely its accidental features which reveal it.

Answer : The Mimamsa upholds the theory of Svatahpramanyavada which may be translated as the theory of self-validity or intrinsic validity of knowledge. All apprehension is intrinsically valid. All knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arises from those very causes from which knowledge itself arises. Validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the cause of knowledge. It is not due to any extraneous conditions. Prabhakara and Kumarila both uphold the intrinsic validity of knowledge. Prabhakara says: All cognitions as cognitions are valid; their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects.

Kumarila also says: The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object; it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object. All knowledge, therefore, is presumably valid and our normal explanation is fact only when knowledge fails to be valid. And its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of knowledge or from a subsequent contradicting knowledge. If a person suffering from Jaundice sees a conch yellow, the knowledge of the yellow couch is invalidated on account of the defect in the organ of vision i.e., on account of the presence of the bile in the eyes. If a rope is mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope snake is invalidated by the subsequent knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity of knowledge is inferred, yet knowledge itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. If validity is not subject to inference, truth is normal; error is abnormal. Belief is nature; disbelief is an exception.

The Mimamsaka advocates the self validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (Utpatti) and accertainment (Jnapti). The validity of knowledge arises together with that knowledge and it is also known as soon as that knowledge is known. The very conditions which give rise to knowledge also give rise to its validity as well as to the belief in that validity. Validity of knowledge and knowledge of that arise together with that knowledge and from those very conditions which give rise to that knowledge neither validity nor belief in that validity is due to any external condition nor requires any verification by anything else. The theory of self validity of knowledge is advocated in these two aspects. If the necessary conditions which give rise to knowledge, e.g., absence of defects in the instruments of knowledge and absence of contradiction are present, knowledge arises and it arises with a belief in its validity. The conditions which give rise to knowledge also give rise to its validity. And this validity is known as soon as the knowledge has arisen.

Madhavacharya in his Sarvadarshana sangraha has mentioned four theories of the validity and invalidity of knowledge. According to Samkhya both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are self evident. According to some schools of Buddhism knowledge is intrinsically invalid and becomes valid through extraneous conditions. According to Nyaya-Vaishesiva, both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are due to extraneous conditions. According to Mimamsa knowledge is intrinsically valid, though its invalidity is due to extraneous conditions.

The Mimamsa criticizes the Samkhya view by pointing out that the same knowledge cannot be both intrinsically valid and invalid. It would be clear self contradiction to maintain that. If it is said that the same knowledge is not regarded as valid and invalid, but what is maintained is only this that valid knowledge reveals its validity and invalid knowledge reveals its invalidity without depending on external conditions then it would be difficult to distinguish between valid and invalid knowledge, invalidity cannot be without external conditions. The Buddhist view is criticized by pointing out that if knowledge is not intrinsically valid, if knowledge which is said to validate the first being itself knowledge is intrinsically invalid and requires knowledge to validate itself and so on and infinities.

The controversy between the Mimamsaka and the Naiyayaika regarding the validity of knowledge has become classic. Nyaya advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge called Paratahpramanyavada. According to it knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after knowledge has arisen. The nature of knowledge is its correspondence with its object. And the test of truth is fruitful activity. The Mimamsaka agrees with the Naiyayika so far as the invalidity of knowledge is concerned, because both regard it as due to extraneous conditions. But he criticizes the Naiyayika in regard to the validity of knowledge. All knowledge is intrinsically valid. If the validity of knowledge also, like its invalidity, depends on extraneous conditions, no knowledge would ever become valid.

Answer : Kumaril Bhatt’s theory of perceptual error is opposed to that of Prabhakar’s explanation of the theory of error though he agrees with him in maintaining the intrinsic validity of knowledge. But he maintains the logical distinction between truth and error whereas Prabhakar does not admit error in the logical sense. Kumaril recognizes error as such and regards it as apprehension and not as mere non apprehension. He further holds that error is a single psychosis, a unitary knowledge and not a composite of two imperfect cognitions. Error is not only of omission but also of commission. Kumaril agrees with Prabhakar in maintaining that in the erroneous perception of ‘this is silver’, two things are present.

The shell is perceived as the ‘this’ bereft of its shellness and silver is imported in memory merely as silver bereft of its thatness, on account of the qualities of whiteness and brightness which are common to both shell and silver. But he differs from Prabhakar and maintains that there is a positive wrong synthesis of these two elements the perceived and the remembered and that error is not due merely to the non apprehension of the distinction between them. The two elements are not united in fact. But they appear to be so in error. Error is partial misrepresentation. Error is not akhyati or non-apprehension but viparita khyati or misapprehension. It is not due to non discrimination between two imperfect cognitions (Vivekhyati), but it is due to a positive wrong synthesis of the two imperfect cognitions which though in fact unrelated, are welded together as a unitary knowledge in error.

Thus error becomes a single psychosis, a unitary cognition, a positive misapprehension and therefore one of commission. The shell is misperceived as silver. Error is a wrong apprehension of one object as another object which in fact it is not. This misapprehension arises due to some defect in the causes of knowledge and is set aside by a subsequent subletting knowledge. But as long as error is experienced it is valid as cognition per se. Its intrinsic validity is set aside by extraneous conditions like defects in the causes of cognition or a contradicting cognition. Knowledge gives up his realism to the extent he admits the subjective or the ideal element in the subjective element creeps into it. Though the two relations are separately real, yet the relation between them is not like that.

Answer : There are two different views in the purva mimamsa concept of khyati or theory of error, given by Prabhakar and Kumarila bhatt. Prabhakara in strict accordance with his view of intrinsic validity of knowledge does not admit error in the logical sense. All knowledge is valid par se. To experience is always to experience validity. Error, therefore, is only partial truth. It is imperfect knowledge. All knowledge, as knowledge, is quite valid, though all knowledge is not necessarily perfect. Imperfect knowledge is commonly called error. But error is true so far as it goes; only it does not go far enough. All knowledge being true, there can be no logical distinction between truth and error. Prabhakar is true to his realistic position in maintaining that knowledge can never misrepresent its object. Error is one of omission only, not of commission. It is only non apprehension, not misapprehension. It is not unitary knowledge, not a single psychosis, but in fact, it consists of two cognitions which really fall apart unrelated. Error is due non discrimination between these two cognitions and their separate objects. It is a mere non apprehension of the distinction between the two cognitions and their objects.

Hence this view of error is called akhayati or non apprehension. Error arises when we forget the fact that instead of single cognition, there are really two cognitions denoting two separate objects and further forget the fact that these two cognitions as well as their object are distinct and unrelated. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakar in maintaining the intrinsic validity of knowledge. But he differs from Prabhakar inasmuch as he maintains the logical distinction between truth and error. He recognizes error as such and regards it as misapprehension and not as mere non-apprehension. He further holds that error is a single psychosis, a unitary knowledge and not a composite of two imperfect cognitions. Error is not only of omission, but also of commission. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in maintaining that in the erroneous perception of ‘this is silver’ two things being present. The shell is perceived as the ‘this’ bereft of its shellness and silver is important in memory merely as silver bereft of its thatness, on account of the qualities of whiteness and brightness which are common to both shell and silver. But he differs from Prabhakar and maintains that there is a positive wrong synthesis of these two elements perceived and the remembered and that error is no due merely to the non apprehension of the distinction between them.

The two elements are not united in fact. But they appear to be so in error. Error is partial misrepresentation. Error is not akhyati or non apprehension but viparita khyti or misapprehension. It is not due to non discrimination between two imperfect cognitions (vivekkhyati), but it is due o a positive wrong synthesis of the two imperfect cognitions which, though in fact unrelated, are welded together as unitary knowledge in error (Viparigrha). Thus error becomes a single psychosis, a unitary cognition, a positive misapprehension and therefore one of commission. The shell is misperceived as silver. Error is a wrong apprehension of one object as another object which in fact it is not.

Answer : The controversy between the Mimamsaka and the Naiyayika regarding the validity of knowledge has become classic. Nyaya advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of knowledge called Paratahapramanyavad. According to it knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after knowledge has arisen. The nature of knowledge is its correspondence with object. And the test of truth is fruitful activity (Samvadipravartti). If knowledge leads to fruitful activity it is valid; if it intrinsically connected with knowledge. They are the result of a subsequent test. Validity is due to excellence (guna) in the causes of knowledge and invalidity is due to defect (dosa) in the causes of knowledge. Knowledge arises simply as knowledge and afterwards becomes valid or invalid due to expresses conditions.

The Mimamsaka agrees with the Naiyayika so far as the invalidity of knowledge apramanya is concerned, because both regard it as due to extraneous conditions. But he criticizes the Naiyayika in regard to the validity (Pramanya) of knowledge. All knowledge is intrinsically valid. If the validity of knowledge also, like its invalidity, depends on extraneous conditions, so knowledge would ever become valid. The Naiyayika contents that knowledge arises simply as knowledge that it is neutral and that the question of its validity or invalidity arises afterwards and depends on external test. The Mimamsaka points out that the so called neutral knowledge is impossibility. We always experience either valid or invalid knowledge. There is no third alternative, we never experience neutral knowledge. To say is to maintain the absurd position that knowledge when it arises is devoid of all logical value. Hence neutral knowledge is no knowledge at all. All knowledge must be either valid or invalid. We admit that the invalidity of knowledge is due to extraneous conditions, e.g. due to some defects in the causes which produce knowledge or due to some contradiction. But the validity cannot be due to any extraneous condition.

Nothing can validate knowledge if is not self valid. The presence of any excellence (guna) in the causes of knowledge cannot make it valid, for no such excellence is known. There is no necessity of assuming any excellence in the causes of knowledge. Freedom from defect and contradiction is sufficient to account for the rise of valid knowledge. If the validity of knowledge is due to an external condition like some excellence in the causes of knowledge or correspondence or fruitful activity, then this second knowledge of excellence or correspondence or fruitful activity would require a third knowledge to validate itself before it can validate the first knowledge and so on and infinitum. Hence the fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided. Hence all knowledge must be regarded as well valid. The so called extraneous conditions like excellence or correspondence or fruitful activity are really neither extraneous nor mere conditions.

Answer : Prabhakara and Kumarila both unlike the Naiyayaika, admit Arthapatti as an independent means of valid knowledge. It is presumption or postulation or implication. It is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived faces. If Devadatta is alive and he is not in his house we presume that he is elsewhere. Being alive and not being in the house are two perceived facts of being elsewhere? It Devadatta is fat and he does not eat during day, we presume that he must be easting during night; otherwise the inconsistency between being fat and not eating during day cannot be explained.

The Naiyayika reduces presumption to inference. The Mimamsaka regards it as an independent pramana. Prabhakara holds that the element of doubt distinguishes presumption from inference. In presumption, there must be a doubt regarding the truth of the two perceived facts which doubt is removed by presumption, while in inference there is no such doubt. Kumarila believes that doubt is not the basis of presumption. This basis is the mutual inconsistency of the two perceived facts.

This inconsistency is removed by presumption. In inference there is no such inconsistency. Prabhabkra and Kumarila both agree in holding that in presumption these is no middle term at all which is the basis of inference. Neither of the two perceived and apparently inconsistent facts can separately serve as a middle term. Both the facts combined appear to be the middle term. But then this combination already includes the conclusion, while a valid middle term should not include the conclusion. Hence presumption is different from inference. But the Naiyayika points out that presumption is disjunctive reasoning which must be reduced to categorical form also. If Devdatta is not in his house, the fact of his being elsewhere is inferred thus:

• Alive Davadatta is either in his house or elsewhere.
• Alive Devadatta is not in his house,
• Therefore Devadatta is elsewhere.
• This disjunctive reasoning might also be reduced to a categorical syllogism form thus:
• All alive persons also are not in their house are elsewhere, Devadatta is an alive person who is no in his house. Therefore Devadatta is an alive person who is elsewhere.
• Similarly, if fat Devadatta does no eat during day, then the fact of his eating during night is inferred thus:
• Fat Devadatta eats either during day or night,
• Fat Devadatta does not eat during day,
• Therefore fat devadatta eats during night.
• This may be reduced to a categorical form thus :
• All fat persons who do not eat during day are persons who eat during night.
• Devadatta is a fat person who does not eat during day. Therefore Devadatta is a fat person who eats during night.

Answer : The Mimamsaka is a pluralistic realist. He believes in the reality of the external world and of the individual souls. There are innumerable individual souls, as many as there are living bodies, plus the bodiless liberated souls. There are innumerable atoms and the other eternal and infinite substances. Mimamsa believes in the Law of Karma, in Unseen Power (apurva), in heaven and hell, in liberation and in the ultimate authority of the eternal authorless Veda. God is ruled out as an unnecessary by hypothesis, though the later Mimamsaka like Apadeva and Laugaski try to bring in God. Mimamsa does not admit the periodic creation and dissolution of this world. The world was never created and never shall it be products arise and perish, yet the world as such, the universe as a whole goes on for ever, uncreated and imperishable. There never was a time when the universe was different from what it is now?

Prabhakara admits seven categories of substance (dravya), quality (guna), action (karma), generality (samanya), inherence (paratantra), force (Shakti) and similarity (Sadrishya). But of these the first five are similar to the categories of the vaishesika, though inherence is here called paratantraa instead of samavaya; and the last two, Shakti and Sadrishya, are added; the Vaishasika category of particularity is equated with the quality of distinctness (Prathaktva) and the category of negation is rejected. kumarila recognizes four positive categories, substance, quality, action and generality and the fifth category of negation which is of four kinds-prior, posterior, mutual and absolute. He rejects particularity and inherence.

Like Prabhakara he reduces particularity to the quality of distinctness. Inherence is reduced to identify-in- difference. It is tadatmya or bhedbheda. It is identify between two different but inseparable objects. Kumarila says that in order to avoid infinite regress, inherence must be regarded as identity which is really identity in difference. Kumarila like Shankara, criticizes the reality of inhrerence and says thatin order to avoid infinite regress, inherence must be regarded as identity which is really which is really identity in difference. Kumarila rejects force and similarity as independent categories and includes them under substance. Kumarila admits the nine substances of the Vaishesika and adds two more-darkness and sound-which are rejected by Prabhakara. The consciousness is not regarded as the essence of the self. Prabhakara agreeing with the Nyaya Vaishesik, holds that the self is essentially unconscious (jada) and that consciousness is only an accidental quality which may or may not be possessed by the soul-substance. Cognitions, feelings and volitions are the properties of the self and arise due to merit and demerit. In liberation, which is due to the exhaustion of merit and demerit, the self remains as a pure substance divested of merit and demerit, the self remains as a pure substance diverted of all its qualities including consciousness and bliss.

Prabhakara advocates the theory of simultaneous revelation of knower, know and knowledge. He believes, like the Naiyayika, that the self is essentially unconscious, but unlike him, he maintains that knowledge is self-luminous. Self-luminous knowledge, therefore, reveals the self as the subject and the known thing as the object simultaneously with itself. Kumarila advocates the theory of cognized ness of object. He believes, like the Naiyayika and unlike Prabhakara that self-consciousness is a later and a higher state of consciousness. But whereas the Naiyayika believes that both consciousness and self are directly revealed in this higher and later state of self-consciousness through introspection, Kumarila believes that consciousness is only inferred indirectly through the cognized ness of the object, though the self is directly revealed as the object of self consciousness or the 1-notion or the Ego-cognition.

It is clear from the above account that Prabhakara and Kumarila both struggle for the correct view of the self, though both of them miss it. Prabhakara is right in maintaining that knowledge is self-luminous, and that the self as the subject is necessarily involved in every knowledge situation and that the self which is the subject can never be known as an object. But he is wrong in confusing pure knowledge with momentary cognitions and in regarding the self as the unconscious substance and consciousness as its accidental quality.

Kumarila is right in saying that consciousness is not an accidental quality of the self and that the self is not explicitly revealed in all knowledge and that self consciousness is higher than consciousness. But he is wrong in saying that consciousness is a dynamic mode of the self, in confusing the self with the ego, in denying the self luminosity of knowledge and making it a thing only to be inferred, and in treating the self as the object of the 1-notion. The real self is the transcendental knower and as the ultimate subject is identical with eternal and foundational consciousness. Prabhakara and kumarila, influenced by the Nyaya-Vaishesika in their pluralistic realisms, fail to treat the self as the real subject and cling to the wrong view that it is essentially a substance.

Answer : Sabha-Pramana has also got the importance in Indian philosophy. Among the Indian schools of philosophy it has got the greatest importance in Mimamsa and Nyaya Schools. Testimony is verbal authority. It is the knowledge of supra-sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumarila divides testimony into personal and impersonal. The former is the testimony of the trustworthy. Person, the latter is the testimony of the Veda. It is valid in itself. It has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. It may be vitiated by doubt and are or and may be contradicted afterwards. The Veda is of eternal and authorless. It is not the work of any person, human or divine. The sags are only the seers not the authors of the Veda. Hence the Vedic injunctions can never be contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. And these can be no internal contradictions in the Veda.

Hence the Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Prabakar admits only Vedic testimony as real testimony and reduces human testimony to inference because its reality is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. Again testimony may give us knowledge of the existent objects or may command us to do something Kumarila admits the distinction between existential and injunctive propositions and limits the scope of the Veda to the latter. Testimony is vernal cognition and is derived form the meanings of worlds which compose sentence. To uphold the eternality and the authorlessness of the Veda Mimamamsaka puts forward the theory that world and meaning as wells as their relation are all natural and eternal. The Nyayika also believes in the authority of the Veda but he regards the Veda as the work of God ad so challenges the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda.

According to him words are not eternal and language is due to the Divine Will or to convention. The Mimamsaka defused this view and points out that only the sounds and the symbols are created and destroyed while the real words are eternal. This view of the Mimamsa can not be supported and destroyed while the real words are eternal. This view of the Mimasaka can not be supported by any rational argument and seems to be a theological dogma.