Empiricism

Answer : According to Hume there are two types of knowledge, named formal knowledge and factual knowledge. The knowledge of mathematics and logic comes within the purview of formal knowledge and the knowledge of factual world is factual knowledge. Formal knowledge is real and essential where as factual knowledge is always probable which may change as per the opinion. Thus he never denies the possibility of knowledge. Rather he differentiates between the natures of these two types of knowledge. He claims that we can only have perceptions or experiences of that which is in the external world (outside of our minds) and that does not necessarily actually describe anything about that which we are observing. But according to David Hume, first of all, it means that all sciences, in spite of all the differences between their subjects and methods, are a specific reflection, not of the nature of external things, but only of the nature of human cognizing ability. So basically, according to him, we cannot separate what we observe from what we are using to observe it i.e, our brains. Further, on these grounds, David Hume posits two systems of reality: the first, the reality of perceptions and memory, and the second, the reality of the mind. The mind is able, on the basis of its judgments, to compose a picture of the Universe in spite of the fact that it never perceives all its parts. But as the “first” and also the “second” system of reality exist only in our sense experience, they do not say anything certain about the nature of the external world, the existence of which even remains problematic.

Answer : The self proclaimed defender of the common sense, Berkeley held that what we perceive really is as we perceive it to be. But what we perceive are just sensible objects, collections of sensible qualities, which are themselves nothing other than ideas in the minds of their perceivers. Take heat, for example; does it exist independently of our perception of it. When exposed to great heat I feel a pain that everyone acknowledges it to be in me, not in the fire, Berkeley argues, so the warmth I feel when exposed to lesser heat must surely be the same. What is more, if dip both of myhands in to a bowl of tepid water after hilling one and warming the other, the water will feel both warm and cold at the same time. Clearly, then, heat as I perceive it is nothing other than an idea in my mind. But sensible objects are nothing more than collections of sensible qualities, so they are merely complex ideas in the minds of those who perceive them. For such ideas, Berkeley held to be just is to be perceived in Latin (esse est percipi). There is no need to refer to the supposition of anything existing outside our minds, which could never be shown to resemble our ideas, since nothing can be like an idea but and idea. Hence there are no material objects. Material substances are inconceivable. Locke’s reference to an unknown substratum in which the features of material substances inhere is a pointless assumption, according to Berkeley. Since it is the very nature of sensible objects to be perceived, on his view, it would be absurd to suppose that their reality depends in any way upon an imperceptible core. This gives rise to a perfectly general argument against even the possibility of material substance. Putting aside all of the forgoing lines of argument, Berkeley declared, the whole issue can be allowed to rest on a single question: is it possible to conceive of a sensible object existing independently of any perceiver. According to Berkeley this argument shows irrefutably that the very concept of material substance as a sensible objects existing independently of any perception is coherent. No wonder the representationlist philosophy leads to skepticism. It introduces as a necessary element in our knowledge of the natural world a concept that is literally inconceivable spirits. Although he maintained that there can be no material substances, Berkeley did not reject the notion of substances altogether. The most crucial feature of substance is activity, he supposed, and in our experience the most obvious example activity is that of perceiving itself. So thinking substances do exist, and for these spirits to be perceived is just to perceive. Strange though Berkeley’s immaterialism may seem, it offers many clear advantages. It is a genuinely empiricist philosophy, since it begins with what we actually experience and claims to account for everything without making extravagant suppositions about unknowable entities.

Answer : This famous statement was given by Berkley, a famous empiricist. Berkeley theorized that individuals cannot know if an object is; they can only know if an object is perceived by a mind. He stated that individuals cannot think or talk about an object’s being, but rather think or talk about an object’s being perceived by someone. That is, individuals cannot know any “real” object or matter “behind” the object as they perceive it, which “causes” their perceptions. He thus concluded that all that individuals know about an object is their perception of it.

Under his theory, the object a person perceives is the only object that the person knows and experiences. If individuals need to speak at all of the “real” or “material” object, the latter in particular being a confused term that Berkeley sought to dispose of, it is this perceived object to which all such names should exclusively refer. This raises the question whether this perceived object is “objective” in the sense of being “the same” for fellow humans. In fact, is the concept of “other” human beings, beyond an individual’s perception of them, valid? Berkeley argued that since an individual experiences other humans in the way they speak to him something which is not originating from any activity of his own and since he learns that their view of the world is consistent with his, he can believe in their existence and in the world being identical or similar for everyone. It follows that:

1. Any knowledge of the world is to be obtained only through direct perception.
2. Error comes about through thinking about what individuals perceive.
3. Knowledge of the world of people, things and actions around them may be purified and perfected merely by stripping away all thought, and with it language, from their pure perceptions. From this it follows that:

1. The ideal form of scientific knowledge is to be obtained by pursuing pure de-intellectualized perceptions.
2. If individuals would pursue these, we would be able to obtain the deepest insights into the natural world and the world of human thought and action that is available to man.
3. The goal of all science, therefore, is to de-intellectualize or de-conceptualize, and thereby purify, human perceptions.

Answer : John Locke, in his Essay defines “substance” as that in which “qualities” inhere. A “quality” is a property of an object that acts on our minds to cause an idea. Locke believes that there is something real out there in the external world that causes the ideas in our minds. These are the “primary qualities” of objects. Locke calls them “primary” because he believes they are objectively out there in the world. The primary qualities act on our senses to cause simple ideas in our minds. Our minds can then reflect on these simple ideas and have further simple ideas and then, on further reflection, complex ideas. One might think that if primary qualities cause simple ideas, then “secondary qualities” ought to cause complex ideas, but this is not what Locke is saying at all. Only primary qualities are really out there. Most simple ideas, like colour, do not correspond to a single primary quality. Colour, although it is uniform and immediate in perception, is not caused by anything in the real world bearing any resemblance to it. One has to go below the level that our senses can deal with (for instance, the level of atoms) to find the primary qualities that act together to form the simple idea of colour. Acting together, these objectively existing primary qualities can be called a “secondary quality”. Secondary qualities do not exist out there in the world: they are subjective, not objective. Both primary and secondary qualities act on our senses to produce in us simple ideas, which can then be built up through reflection into complex ideas. There are relatively few primary qualities. Most qualities of an object are secondary, and built up from a relatively small set of primary qualities.

The important ones that Locke mentions are: extension, solidity, shape and motion. Some secondary qualities are colour, taste and smell, but there are many more. Why Locke chooses the particular qualities he does as primary, and whether he is justified in his choices, is debatable, but this question is not important for our concerns. What is important to us is that Locke does believe that there are some qualities that are primary and that real substances out in the world really do have them—they are not just constructions in our minds.

In primary qualities, we find the crucial metaphysical position behind Locke’s refusal to do away utterly with the confused idea of substance. Our ideas of particular substances are examples of complex ideas. For instance, our complex idea of a lump of Gold, like all ideas of substance, consists of numerous simple ideas such as yellowness and hardness, plus the “idea” of “pure substance”: something out there in the external world that has the collection of qualities. Once our minds, through internal reflection, have lumped a group of simple ideas into a complex idea of substance, we tend to just think of the idea as simple, it seems so second nature to us. Most of us suppose there to be some kind of something, a substratum that underlies this collection of qualities, since we cannot imagine how these qualities could subsist in the world all on their own. This is the idea of “pure substance”, which seems, at first blow, like a very common-sensical idea. There must be something that is yellow and hard out there, not just yellowness and hardness floating about by them. So any comprehensible description of pure substance must be in terms of primary qualities: external “powers” to produce ideas in us. But of course this cannot work, since the whole idea of “pure” substance is that it is the thing itself that has all these qualities in the first place.

Locke takes it as given that the substance, the thing itself, cannot be the primary qualities on their own, since qualities by themselves have no existence: our complex idea of them does not include the simple idea of existence. So, not seeing how to define substance, and yet not seeing how qualities can subsist all on their own out there in the world, Locke ends up using the idea of substance after all. We know there is pure substance, he reasons, because we can sense matter and reflect on our own existence as spirits.

Existence is a simple idea for Locke. After all, can you break the idea of existence down into its parts? No. We simply experience through sensation, in our perception, that external objects exist, and we experience our own consciousness existing through immediate reflection on our own thoughts. This immediate perception of existence tells us there must be substances. Motion and duration, like existence, are also simple ideas that apply to substances and that we experience directly. But neither existence nor motion nor duration can be understood any further than this. Their true natures—the primary qualities that conspire to generate them in us—remain completely mysterious.

It is existence, however, not motion or duration, that seems essential to substance. Locke contrasts complex ideas of substances (i.e., existing things) with “modes”, complex ideas that do not include any supposition of existence: such as beauty, triangle and gratitude. One could imagine having a substance that cannot move, but it is hard to imagine what a substance would be that did not exist. It is not clear to me the extent to which substance and existence are supposed to be distinct ideas for Locke; the way he describes them, they seem to amount to the same thing. Existence proves substance, and a substance is defined as that which includes existence. Perhaps Locke talks about existence as a simple idea apart from substance because he wants to use it as a proof of substance. First, he tells us that the idea of pure substance cannot be had by sensation or reflections, which are the ultimate sources of all our ideas. This is why it is confused, and not really an idea at all. Then he turns around and tells us that existence is directly known though sensation and reflection, and this proves that there is substance, which is defined as that which has existence. We know there are substances, though substance is not a coherent idea, because of our direct perception of the idea of existence. If this is what Locke is up to, it will not help him out of his dilemma one whit. For if a substance is defined as an existing thing, pure substance and existence is the same idea, or at the very least, if the idea of pure substance is empty and confused, then so must be the idea of existence.

But on the one hand Lock scorns this nonsensical notion of substance as childish, and then suddenly he is saying that we can “know” that there is such a thing. Granted, he makes it clear that since we can only know what comes to us through sensation and reflection, we can never know anything about substance beyond the simple fact that it must exist out there. We cannot ever know any of its “qualities”, which would not even be qualities for us by Locke’s definitions, since they would have no power to give us any sensations or reflections whatsoever. They must forever remain, to humans, mysterious what-nots, if they be at all.

Answer : Locke follows Descartes lead in searching for some minimal starting point on which to build a sound theory of knowledge. He eventually gives assent to three kinds of knowledge: intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive. All are based upon “ideas”. Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement between “ideas”. He presents four ways of apprehending this agreement or disagreement. They aren’t ways of apprehending agreement or disagreement per se, but are ways of “knowing” regarding ideas. Locke is explicitly committed to the existence of ideas as objects of the mind and the means to knowledge. By implication however, he is also “ontologically committed” to external objects which “cause” certain “ideas”—those which give rise to “sensible knowledge”. The fundamental building block of Locke’s theory of knowledge is the “idea”. Ideas are the objects of the mind with which we think and by which we know.

Some ideas are expressible by words. Other ideas seem like images, not adequately expressible with a thousand words. It is the difficulty with getting past ideas that later philosophers believe leads to solipsism. The only direct experiences we have is of our ideas themselves. This includes our ideas of experiencing other persons. There is just no alternative but our “idea” of another person. I don’t think Locke would have carried this quite so far. He gave great credence to “sensible knowledge” which will be discussed more lately. By identity or diversity, Locke means that we are able to perceive ideas in two ways; we identify or recognize them, and we are able to distinguish them from one another. Identity is to perceive an idea “agrees with itself”, while diversity is to perceive that distinct ideas “disagree with each other”.

The mind may compare distinct ideas in several ways and find agreement or disagreement (knowledge) in such comparisons. The agreement or disagreement of relations is limited by our ability to discover intermediate ideas with which to demonstrate the agreement. It is this way of apprehending agreement or disagreement that provides the basis for deduction. A deductive reasoning process proceeds by finding pair wise agreement between a sequence of “steps” that eventually allows finding agreement between the starting and ending points. “Relation”, as Locke defines it, gives us a place in our scheme of knowing to justify our basic rules of inference. Though limited in scope, this is very important in our knowledge of substance.

Simple ideas “coexist” in a subject. Our ideas of species of substance consist of collections of such coexisting complexes. By “real existence”, Locke means our ideas which are “caused” by external objects. This concession is what brings Locke into the empiricist camp. He is giving the status of knowledge to some things we perceive. As Locke puts it, “Some ‘real existence’ agrees to an idea.” Locke appears to reserve this to ideas “corresponding to” something outside the mind. This kind of agreement or disagreement is not strictly between ideas; we would say that the “agreement” is between the idea and its physical referent; a correspondence theory of reference is suggested here.

Answer : Philosophical skepticism is a critical attitude which systematically questions the notion that absolute knowledge and certainty are possible, either in general or in particular fields. Philosophical skepticism is opposed to philosophical dogmatism, which maintains that a certain set of positive statements are authoritative, absolutely certain and true. Philosophical skepticism should be distinguished from ordinary skepticism, where doubts are raised against certain beliefs or types of beliefs because the evidence for the particular belief or type of belief is weak or lacking. Ordinary skeptics are not credulous or gullible. They don’t take things on trust, but must see the evidence before believing. Ordinary skeptics doubt the miraculous claims of religions, the claims of alien abductions, the claims of psychoanalysis, etc. But they do not necessarily doubt that certainty or knowledge is possible. Nor do they doubt these things because of systematic arguments that undermine all knowledge claims.

While Descartes’ method of doubt is a method for discovering the foundations of knowledge, Hume’s skepticism is designed to undermine ordinary claims to knowledge. According to Hume, knowledge of the external world can be established neither deductively nor inductively. Induction rests on the presupposition that nature is uniform, that the future will resemble the past. But this presupposition cannot be justified. Nor can knowledge of the external world be gained through deduction, for information about physical objects goes beyond what is immediately perceived. Thus matters of fact and existence cannot be objects of knowledge, because the inference which legitimizes the transition from past experience to future occurrence is not rationally defensible.

Actually Hume’s epistemology is quite unencumbered by skeptical worries about the existence of the physical world. However, Hume’s philosophical preoccupations are shaped by a new kind of skepticism, which is most clearly expressed in his book. For Hume, the problem of epistemology is justificatory: it must be established how people take themselves to have knowledge of the causal order of nature. For “nature,” Hume remarks, “has kept us at a great distance from all of her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these objects entirely depends”. The problem Hume identifies can be traced back to Locke, who noted that people do not have knowledge of the corpuscular microstructure of things.

They have knowledge only of the “nominal essence” of things; in other words, humans identify natural kinds on the basis of observable qualities that are constantly conjoined in experience, but since they cannot give an account of the corpuscular microstructure that allows them to observe these qualities, they do not have knowledge of the “real essence” of things. Hume generates a skeptical worry out of this: given that one has no cognitive access to the “secret nature” of things, then for all one knows this “secret nature” could change without any alteration in the observable properties of things. Hume recognizes that ordinary human cognitive practices carry on without people becoming encumbered by this skeptical worry. Yet “as a philosopher,” he wonders: On what basis do we infer that the regular course of our experience should be a guide to determining a necessary connection of events observed in nature?

Hume responds to his “skeptical doubts” with a “skeptical solution”. People are able to make causal determinations only in a “subjective” fashion. In the course of experience, human minds are shaped by repetitions in circumstances. The result is the formation of tacit expectations, or anticipatory dispositions, which Hume calls “customs.” These anticipatory dispositions are formed mechanically through associations of the imagination. The necessary connection thought in the concept of cause is merely something that “we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant”. This “sentiment,” Hume argues, is the source of the concept of causality. Thus Hume ends up with the following view. It cannot be said that one thing (A) brings about an effect in another thing (B); it may be said that representations of A are customarily conjoined with representations of B. Thus the necessity thought in the concept of cause is merely subjective: when faced with an event of type A, a subject cannot help but to anticipate an event of type B. The philosophical importance of Hume’s argument against induction cannot be doubted. The impact of the argument on twentieth-century philosophy of science in particular has been profound.

Popper’s entire theory of knowledge was based on the supposition that Hume had proved the irrationality of using induction: hence his attempt to show that science does not actually proceed inductively at all. Reichenbach also accorded great significance to Hume’s argument, which he considered the ‘heaviest blow’ against empiricism, though he thought induction could be given a sort of justification. Carnap regarded the traditional Humean fonnulation of the problem of induction as ‘not the right way’ of asking the question, but still attributed great importance to the issue of induction’s rationality.The approaches to induction favoured by Popper, Reichenbach and Carnap find few adherents today, but contemporary philosophers of science continue to invest Hume’s arguments with a high degree of philosophical significance.

Answer : The analytic system of induction is that by which one can predict occurrences in the universe around us. It is the method through which a great deal of our knowledge is found, yet is the topic of controversy in philosophical circles, due to work done by David Hume. The ‘received view’ is that Hume was sceptical about induction - that he believed that conclusion through induction was unreasonable. Recently, however, a different thesis has been put forward claiming that Hume was not sceptical, he was simply pointing out the weaknesses of induction. In order to examine this question, this ‘received view’ shall be looked at first, followed by an explanation of the new view.

After these two opposing views on Hume have been compared, inductive method shall been studied, to see if these views on induction can be better clarified or improved upon. The ‘received view’ of Hume’s opinions on induction, put most simply, is that Hume was a sceptic about induction; that he believed that to base knowledge on inductive method was unreasonable. Proponents of this view see Hume’s argument as follows: All factual belief is based solely on instinct, therefore factual belief is irrational. Since inductively derived belief is a subset of factual belief, then inductive conclusions are also irrational. Put another way, the argument for Hume’s scepticism is this: The entire institution of inductive reasoning can not be justified, so no inductive conclusion can be justified. This argument is arrived at by interpreting Hume’s passages on induction as a critique, rather than simply an investigation. Hume does indeed say that induction has no logical necessity, due to the fact that the relation between cause and effect seems to be one of ‘imagination’. Supporters of this ‘received view’ claim that this means that Hume believes that a conclusion reached by induction is not a rational one - that Hume is an irrationalist. More recently there has been a move towards reconciling Hume and inductive method, mainly to save a great deal of Hume’s work with inductive method.

Opponents of the ‘received view’ of Hume on induction ask why Hume would undermine inductive method, when it is inductive method that he develops and uses all through his philosophy. In order to save induction, opponents of the ‘received view’ attack the premises that the ‘received view’ imposes on Hume. These are such that Hume tries to find ‘external justification’ for induction - a non-circular argument for the rationality of induction - and fails, thus confining induction to the category of irrational method of conclusion. The opponents of these premises point out that Hume is not trying to justify induction outright, and therefore justifying the everyday use of induction. They argue that Hume simply shows that ‘demonstrative reason’ does not prove matters of fact, and that induction has no logical necessity. What these statements rest upon is basically Hume’s idea of causation, upon which his ideas of induction lie. Induction is used to prove matters of fact, yet induction is not a ‘demonstrative proof’. Neither can it be shown that the process of induction can be justified logically. This is the idea that the opponents of the received view wish to be understood as Hume’s view.

Answer : Berkeley is of opinion that all ordinary physical objects are collections of ideas, and since they are ideas, they exist only if and when they are perceived. As Berkeley says, to be (exist) is to be perceived. Let’s look at two relevant arguments. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence so ever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived? In other words,

• Ordinary physical objects are things we perceive by sense.
• What we perceive by sense are our ideas.
• So, ordinary physical objects are (collections of) ideas.

Locke believes we can perceive ordinary objects like table and chairs. And Locke agrees that we can only be conscious of our ideas. But as per Locke’s theory of Representative Realism we perceive physical objects is to say that we are indirectly aware of these objects in virtue of being directly aware of sensory ideas. Locke would not want to say that we perceive ordinary objects directly. So Locke would read premise (1) as ordinary physical objects are things we indirectly perceive by sense. Locke would agree with Berkeley, however, that we are only directly aware of ideas. We aren’t typically aware of our ideas by being aware of proxies or representations. The ideas are the representations. So Locke says that what we directly perceive by sense are our ideas.

Answer : Hume’s view of phenomenalism is the further extension the views of Locke and Berkley. Even though an ultimate explanation of both the subject and object of knowledge is impossible, He provides a description of how man senses and understands. He emphasizes the utility of knowledge as opposed to its correctness and suggests that experience begins with feeling rather than thought. He uses the term “perception” in its traditional sense—that is, whatever can be present to the mind from the senses, passions, thought, or reflection. Nonetheless he distinguishes between impressions which are felt and ideas which are thought. In this he stresses the difference between feeling a toothache and thinking about such a pain, which had been obscured by both rationalists and empiricists. Both impressions and ideas are subdivided further into simple and complex; for example, the idea of heat is simple, while the idea of combustion is complex.

These simple divisions are the basis for Hume’s “phenomenalism” (that is, knowledge consists of “appearances” in the mind). Hume distinguishes the various operations of the mind in a descriptive psychology or “mental geography.” Impressions are described as vivacious and lively, whereas ideas are less vivid and, in fact, derived from original impressions. This thesis leads to the conclusion that “we can never think of any thing which we have not seen without us or felt in our own minds.” Hume often overestimates the importance of this discovery with the suggestion that the sole criterion for judging ideas is to remove every philosophical ambiguity by asking “from what impression is that supposed idea derived.” If there is no corresponding impression, the idea may be dismissed as meaningless.

This assumption that all ideas are reducible, in principle, to some impression is a primary commitment of Hume’s empiricism. Hume did admit that there are complex ideas, such as the idea of a city, those are not traceable to any single impression. These complex ideas are produced by the freedom of the imagination to transform and relate ideas independently of impressions; such ideas are not susceptible to empirical verification. This represents the major paradox of Hume’s philosophy—the imagination which produces every idea beyond sensible immediacy also denies the truth of ideas.

Answer : Hume denies the existence of soul or self and so his explanation of identity is different from other empiricist. Hume’ also investigated a person’s character, the relationship between human and animal nature, and the nature of agency. Hume pointed out that we tend to think that we are the same person we were five years ago. Though we’ve changed in many respects, the same person appears present as was present then. We might start thinking about which features can be changed without changing the underlying self. Hume, however, denies that there is a distinction between the various features of a person and the mysterious self that supposedly bears those features.

When we start introspecting, “we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement”. It is plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. Note in particular that, in Hume’s view, these perceptions do not belong to anything. Rather, Hume compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements.

The question of personal identity then becomes a matter of characterizing the loose cohesion of one’s personal experience. Hume said mysteriously that he was dissatisfied with his account of the self, yet he never returned to the issue. In short, what matters for Hume is not that ‘identity’ exists but that the relations of causation, contiguity, and resemblances obtain among the perceptions.

Answer : ‘What am I’ is the question which is generally asked and answered differently, since the history of thought. It is related to one’s identity, so everyone gives different answer according to their personal history, physical features and circumstances. For Hume self is neither a body, nor a mind, nor a combination of both, nor an unknown substance as some thinkers generally say and defend. It is only a series of experiences, a series of feelings, sensations, desires, thoughts, beliefs etc. after that he considers the problem of personal identity by adopting the classical exposition of the positivist’s theory of personal identity. It is the view of those thinkers, who adopted sceptical view and also think that the idea of self can be described in the empirical or linguistic formula.

It is common to all positivists that they think self is an abstraction from the facts with no ontological status of its own. Hume is against those philosophers, who believe in the conception that we have an idea of a permanent, independent and immaterial self and its continuous identity. He is not satisfied with this thinking that the idea of self is the foundation of all our emotions, passions, thoughts and desires etc. He thinks that all these are different and separate from each other and may be separately consider and exist. Hume says there should be one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But we don’t have any such impression about the self.

Hume refutes the existence of all material and immaterial substances. Hume argued that if we can directly know, we know nothing but the object of our sense experience as ideas and impressions only. He says these are all different and separable so, there is no need for their support. When we examine we found nothing, what we call it a self or any certain principle. Our mind is like a stage of a theatre in which thoughts and ideas come in a procession. All thoughts are transitory and temporary. The only reason for suspecting the existence of self is that the rapidity of their change causes an illusion. He says we should try to be clear that we are just concentrating mind on only successive perceptions, not where they are presented. So, self is merely a composition of successive impressions. We can compare this idea of Hume with Buddha. He also rejects commonly believed conception of self though he does not deny the continuity of the stream successive states that compose life.

The self or the ego denotes nothing more than this collection and the existence of man depends on this collection and it dissolves when the collection breaks up. But there is much difference between above conception of the self and Hume’s conception of self. Now, here a problem arises about this view that if we have not any permanent self, then how can we explain personal identity? And how can we justify this conception?

Firstly, John Locke introduced problem of personal identity in his book An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke defines a person as a “thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.” This self-consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, constitutes the essence of personality. Consequently the identity of a person is to be found in the identity of consciousness. Of course, we are not always conscious. In contrast to Locke, Hume does not believe in an identical self. For him there are no constant and invariable impressions of such a self and that introspection does not discover anything, but particular perceptions. Thus we can have only particular sensation and emotions, but no impression of self.

Hume’s discussion of personal identity is primarily built on the major role of the imagination, which it plays in the formation of belief. From this formation of belief in general, we arrive at belief in causes, continued existence, and then on to the personal identity. Hume uses the word ‘feign’ to explain this conception of personal identity. By the reason of memory and imagination we “make believe” in the continued existence of a “self” or identical personality during these interruptions by the same methods and for the same reasons as I feign the continued existence of external world. For Hume identity depends upon the three relations of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. It follows from these principles that the notion of personal identity proceeds from the “smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought” by its continuity. Hume thinks that the identity which we ascribe for the human mind is same as the identity what we ascribe to vegetables and animals, it is fictitious one. This is only by the reason of imagination that we do with another object. With reference to the personal identity, Hume’s above said theory is not far from fallacies and difficulties.

Actually, he himself knows that his principle is not completely satisfactory. It is related to inheritenceness and composition of perceptions. If all our perceptions are different and independent to each other and there is no idea of self then, Hume questions how were they organized and related to each other. In other words, we ask this question as what is the prime substance and principle by which we integrate and organize our perceptions. Hume himself asks this question and he found himself incompetent to answer it. Hume sums up the discussion of personal identity by saying that his whole examination of this question reveals that most of the disputes about personal identity are ‘merely verbal’ he says it is a grammatical rather than a philosophical problem.

Modern logical positivists have tried to give an empirical explanation of this theory, as Hume does. But, it has also some dogmaticism and it failed to give any satisfactory solution. Many philosophers have criticized Hume’s ideas by various points. Some are related to memory that it is not the only criterion for the self. Although memory seems to be the most important and the primary criterion to the discovery of the personal identity, but it is not only based on memory and continuity but on some other factors also. Chisholm attacks on Humean position to say that Hume made a conceptual error in his notion of what constitutes the idea of self, he seems contradictory when he examine self in experience and lastly, he is only aware about particular mental data.

According to Flage Reid’s and Beattie found Hume’s theory of mind has many misconceptions and it is not much clear. And lastly, we cannot perceive self as an object as Hume does because we cannot deny our experiences of self-awareness. This self awareness makes possible all concentration and contemplation. The self which is the basis of all knowledge cannot be perceived as an object. Copleston found that Hume’s use the ambiguous word ‘identity’ and memory not possible in his theory and Ayer also defends it. Finally, it is also to be considered that Hume accepts skepticism in his all logical and philosophical speculations. According to skepticism, we cannot get the definite knowledge of anything.

Therefore, we should think all our knowledge suspicious and shouldn’t try to give any definite judgment about any problem or principle. Hume follows this rule in his entire speculation, but softly. He realizes that one cannot follow this rule in his practical life, if we will adopt this we cannot do anything faithfully and cannot live whole life easily. Hume’s ideas not only affected Eighteenth and Nineteenth century philosophy, but also effects contemporary philosophy. Most problems which are discussed as contemporary issues are due to Hume’s critical philosophy. In present times, analytical point of view is more dominant. It also gets inspiration and effect from Hume. His thinking not only affects epistemology and metaphysics, but every field of philosophy. Two major theories of contemporary ethics Emotivism and Prescriptivism have originated from his thinking. Mostly thinkers like Moore, Russell, Wittegenstein, Carnap, Ayer etc. are inspired by Hume’s speculations.

Answer : Critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body and the mental states are separable from physical states was given by Ryle. According to Ryle, the classical theory of mind, as represented by Cartesian rationalism, asserts that there is a basic distinction between mind and matter. However, the classical theory makes a basic “category-mistake,” because it attempts to analyze the relation between “mind” and “body” as if they were terms of the same logical category. Ryle rejects Descartes’ theory of the relation between mind and body, on the grounds that it approaches the investigation of mental processes as if they could be isolated from physical processes. In order to demonstrate how this theory may be misleading, he explains that knowing how to perform an act skillfully may not only be a matter of being able to reason practically but may also be a matter of being able to put practical reasoning into action. Practical actions may not necessarily be produced by highly theoretical reasoning or by complex sequences of intellectual operations.

The meaning of actions may not be explained by making inferences about hidden mental processes, but it may be explained by examining the rules that govern those actions. According to Ryle, mental processes are merely intelligent acts. There are no mental processes that are distinct from intelligent acts. The operations of the mind are not merely represented by intelligent acts; they are the same as those intelligent acts. Thus, acts of learning, remembering, imagining, knowing, or willing are not merely clues to hidden mental processes or to complex sequences of intellectual operations, they are the way in which those mental processes or intellectual operations are defined. Logical propositions are not merely clues to modes of reasoning; they are those modes of reasoning. The rationalist theory that the will is a faculty within the mind and that volitions are mental processes which the human body transforms into physical acts is therefore a misconception. This theory mistakenly assumes that mental acts are distinct from physical acts and that there is a mental world which is distinct from the physical world.

This theory of the separability of mind and body is described by Ryle as “the dogma of the ghost in the machine.”2 He explains that there is no hidden entity called “the mind” inside a mechanical apparatus called “the body.” The workings of the mind are not an independent mechanism which governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body and may be better conceptualized as a way of explaining the actions of the body.

Answer : Fundamentally Scepticism originated as a response to the eternal debate between Realism and Idealism. The Skeptic intervened with the observation we cannot determine whether Reality is real or an illusion, therefore the debate between Realism and Idealism can never be settled. We will never know the truth. A more radical form of Skepticism is a natural extension of this observation which then assumes since we cannot know this fundamental truth about Reality, and everything is part of Reality, we cannot know the fundamental truth about anything. Fundamental Solipsism begins where Skepticism leaves off.

The Solipsist states ‘I don’t care’ whether Reality is real or an illusion. If I cannot tell the difference, then to me there is no difference. The only thing that matters to me is how I perceive Reality. If I kick a rock I will perceive pain whether or not the rock is real or only an illusion in my own mind. Rational Solipsism goes further in its observation that since I know I exist, but I cannot be certain anything else actually does, then the only Reality is the Reality that exists in my own mind. It makes no difference what so ever if there is independent existence beyond my perception. If I do not observe it; it does not exist in my Reality.

Fundamentally we are all Rational Solipsist within our own minds as the only Reality we can be aware of is the Reality which we personally perceive. Whether our perceived Reality is a true representation of what actually exists is beyond our ability to ascertain since we can only know what exists within our own perceptions. When we perceive an object we are not actually seeing the object itself; we examine the image of that object that is projected within our own minds. We cannot know for certain how any other mind perceives that same object, or its own Reality. Absolute Solipsism takes the concept to its extreme and states since the only truth that exists is in my own mind, and my mind is the only mind I can be certain exists, then everything I perceive must be an illusion of my own mind. No thing, and no other minds, really exists. I am absolutely alone in my own Universe.

Answer : Empiricism is related to pragmatism in that it draws our attention to the world of experience. It maintains that human knowledge arises from the senses or through experience. William James took a step further to become the founder of what is known as Radical Empiricism. Unlike rationalists, who believed that reality is already made, James thought of reality as still in the making. This pragmatic view relies heavily on Empiricism and experience. James believed that experiences isgiven, and truth means adequacy to experience, or workability in practice. His Radical Empiricism finds connection between experiences in itself. James believed that experiences know, believe, and remember other experiences. He considered connections such as there to be intellectual or conceptual connections or non-intellectual connections or extra experiences.

Mental connections are the connections which have a cause and effect relationship. Connections of this sort have the tendency for one experience to follow another such as smoke after fire and pain after intense heat on the skin. James believed that to be radical, empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced not exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. He described Radical Empiricism as a loose universe where experience lean on nothing but other finite experiences and the whole of them, if such a whole there be, leans on nothing. Radical Empiricism differs from traditional British Empiricism in that instead of focusing on the experience of reality, it focuses on the reality of experience. Also, Radical Empiricism emphasizes the world of experience; where as British Empiricism emphasizes the experience of the world.

Another major difference between James’ Radical Empiricism and traditional British Empiricism can be found in the relations between things in experience. James believed that relations between things in experience are as real as the things that are related, while British Empiricists, such as Hume and Locke, assumed that experience presents itself in separate bits devoid of any relations. James criticized British Empiricists for missing these connections disclosed by experience and he criticized rationalists and idealists for making those connections transcendental rather than empirical. James believed that the only reality in the universe is pure experience. He believed that experiences are carved out of pure experience. James proposed that these is one primary material in the whole world, and if we call that material pure experience, then knowing can be explained as a relation into which portions of pure experience may enter. In such relations, one experience knows another.

Answer : This term was introduced by English philosopher Gilbert Ryle for cases where we talk of something in terms appropriate only to something of a radically different kind. For example, the prime minister is in London, and the foreign secretary is in Paris, and the Home Secretary is in British, but where is the government. The government is not another person alongside its members. Ryle used the nation primarily to claim that mind and body can not be spoken of in a parallel ways, but are in different ‘categories’. One problem is to say when things are indeed in different categories. Ryle picks up on this point and tries to show how such philosopher as Descartes have distorted language. Since mind can only mean ‘what it is like to be me’ or “Your experience of the World” it is a distortion of language to make it mean a distinct mental substance”- as Descartes attempts to. Such an attempt is called by Ryle a “category mistake” Ryle uses this approach to dismantle the mind body problem as stemming from misinterpretation of common terms. For instance, imagine someone were to ask to be shown your home.

So, you show them the living room, bedrooms, bathrooms, Kitchen, etc. but on finishing this they say, that is very nice- but now show me your home. This short of mistake would be perturbing because what they have been shown is your home and yet, Ryle argues, this is what Descartes and other dualists are doing when they are looking for some special entity separate from the body and forms of behavior called mind. Ryle alleges that it is a mistake to treat the mind as an object made of an immaterial substance because predictions of substance are not meaningful for a collection of dispositions and capacities. Many philosophers have employed Ryle’s idea of a category mistake, but there is no lasting agreement on how to identify category mistake.

Answer : The problem of induction has received a great deal of critical attention. Though Hume offered his own solution, many have since questioned whether he was successful. Hume argues that induction is founded on the persistence of realities (sometimes called the Uniformity of that use) and that we cannot know nature is uniform through reason, because reason only comes in two sorts and both of them are inadequate.

The two sorts are; Probable reasoning (effectively, deductive reasoning) and Demonstrative reasoning (effectively, deductive reasoning). With regard to first Hume argues that founding regularity on the fact that regularity has always operated in the past (inductive reasoning) is arguing in a circle, because induction was the very process we were trying to explain in the first place. With regard to second Hume argues that we cannot prove a priori that regularities will continue, as it is consistent and conceivable than the course of nature might change. Hence no form of reason will sponsor inductive inference. This argument has been criticized in more than ore area. For example, some have maintained that Kantian arguments can establish that nature is uniform. Some counter, however that if Kantian arguments can prove a priori that nature is uniform in general, this does not make inductive inference rational, because there is still the problem of making out which particular regularity will continue.

A further criticism is that there are more types of reasoning that Hume allows (the demonstrative and probability distributions), for one can give indeed, it might be that a demonstration of the high probability distributions, and it might be that a demonstration of the high probability of success of an inductive policy can succeed in showing induction to be rational. In response to the Hume’s arguments P.F Strawson gives an analytic solution. It contends that the question of whether induction is rational is nonsense as when we say something is rational; we just mean it is inductive (or deductive). That is why any inductive inference is a ‘rational’ inference, because inductive inference is the sort of things taken as defining the concept of ‘reason’, or rational argumentation.

Answer : In his book Appearance and reality the Bradley’s considered view is that neither external nor internal relations, not yet their terms, use real, and that is the proper conclusion of his arguments. It is clear from his argument as well as from his own explanation. That for him ‘real’ is a technical term: to be real is to be an individual substance, so that to deny the reality of relations is to deny that they are independent existence. It is this which explains reactions like Broad’s : in common with others, he took Bradley to be assuming that relations are a kind of object, when what Bradley was doing was arguing by a kind of reduction against that very assumption.

Some, however, have thought that the denial of the reality of relations amount to the assertion that all relational judgments are false, so that it is for example not true that 7 is greater than 3 or that hydrogen is lighter than oxygen. Such an interpretation is made credible on Bradley’s account of truth, for on that account no ordinary Judgment is ever perfectly true. In consequence, to one who reads him under the influence of the later but anachronistic assumption that truth is two valued, his claim appears to be that relational Judgments are false.

On Bradley’s account of truth, however, while for ordinary purposes it is true that 7 is greater than 3 and false that oxygen is lighter than hydrogen, once we try to meet the more exacting demands of metaphysics. We are forced to recognize that truth admits degrees and that, while the former is undoubtedly truer of their Judgments, though has nothing to do with it being relational rather than predictive. For, as was observed above in the section on Logic, Bradley thought all Judgment to be detective in that representation can proceed only on the basis of separating in thought what is not separate in reality; when; forexample, we say these apples are hard and sour, we not only implicitly obstruct the apples from their container but detach the hardness and sourness from each other and abstract them from the apples themselves perfect truth, one completely faithful to reality, would thus have to be one which did not obstruct from realty at all; and this means that it would have to be identical with the whole of reality and accordingly no longer even a judgment. The final truth about reality is, on Bradley’s view, quite literally and in principle inexpressible. It is, however, possible to give an outline.

The impression of reality’s consisting of a multiplicity of related objects is a result of the separations imposed by thought.In fact ‘the Absolute is not many; these are no independent Real. Reality is one but one what? Experience, he says in a wide sense of the term; Feeling, thought and volition are all the material of existence and these is no other material, actual or even possible. The immediate argument he gives for this unintuitive doctrine is brief to the points of high handedness, merely challenging the philosopher to think otherwise self contradiction; his greater concern is to make it quite clear that this experience does belong to any individual mind, and his doctrine is quite clear that this experience does not belong to any individual mind and his doctrine not a form of solipsism. But he is not quite as offhand as he appears for he soon makes clear that he thinks the theory of appearance and reality is the best explanation argument for this objective idealism.

He says that the Absolute is one system and its consent is nothing but sentient experience. It will hence be a single and all inclusive experience which embraces partial diversity in concord. For, it cannot be less than appearance, and hence no feeling or thought, of any kind can fall outside its limit. But how can we understand this diversity to be possible, when it cannot be accounted for through terms and relations. Bradley’s answer is that we cannot understand this in detail but get some group on what the means by considering a pre conceptual state to immediate experience in which there are differences but no separations, a state from which our familiar, cognitive, admit human consciousness arises by imposing conceptual thought itself, is included in one comprehensive and harmonious whole. Appearances thus contribute to the whole work of art detached from their background.

They would lose their significance and might be in isolation even be ugly; in context, they can themselves be beautiful and make an essential contribution to the beauty context, they can themselves be beautiful and make an essential contribution to the beauty and integrity of the whole. Such limited comparisons are all the help we can get in understanding the Absolute and its relation to its appearance. Bradley rejects as impossible the demand for detailed explanations of how phenomena like error and evil belong to the absolute, instead trying to shift the burden of proof to critics who express confidence in their incompatibility. His general answer is that anything that exists, even the worst of evils, is somehow real. The Absolute must comprehend both evil and good. But, Just as truth admits of degrees, a Judgment being less true farther it from comprehending the whole of reality, so reality itself admits of degrees, a phenomenon being the less real. It is just a fragmentary aspects of the whole. The absolute is in such a way further from evil Absolute is in such a way further from evil then from good, but is itself neither transcending them both as it transcends even religion it is in a sense a supreme Being, but not a personal God.

In Bradley’s often rhapsodic description of the Absolute, a conception of the world based both on his skeptical scrutiny of the inadequacies of philosophers accounts of Judgment and, it is clear, on a kind of personal experience of a higher unity which in another context might have made him one of the world’s revered religions mystics what he called the great problem of the relation between thought and reality. It stands in western philosophy as a permanent and unsettling challenge to the capacity of discursive thought to display the world without distortion.

Answer : The central focus of Dewey’s philosophical interests revolves around his conception of knowledge and theory of truth. It is indicative, however, of Dewey’s critical stance towards post effort in this area that he expressly rejected the term “epistemology”, preferring the theory of enquiry or experimental logic as more representative of his own approach.

In Dewey’s view, traditional epistemologies, whether rationalist or empiricist, had drawn too stark a distinction between thought the domain of knowledge, and the world of fact to which thought purportedly referred. Thought was believed to exist apart from the world, epistemologically as the object of immediate awareness, commitment as the unique aspect of the self, the commitment of modern rationalism stemming from Descartes, to a doctrine of innate ideas, ideas constituted had effected this dichotomy, but the modern empiricist, beginning with Locke had done the same just as markedly by their commitment to an introspective methodology and a representational theory of ideas. The resulting view makes a mystery of the relevance of thought to the world; if thought constitutes a domain that stands apart from the world, how can its accuracy as an account of the world ever be established? For Dewey a new model, rejecting traditional presumptions, was wanting, a model that Dewey endeavored to develop and refine throughout his years of writing and reflection.

Dewy offered a solution to the epistemology. Issues regarding theory of truth along the lines of his early acceptance of Hegelian idealism; the world of fact does not stand apart from thought, but itself defined within thought as its objective manifestation. But during the succeeding decade Dewey gradually came to reject this solution as confused and inadequate. A number of influences have bearing on Dewey’s change of view.

For one Hegelian idealism was not conducive to accommodating the methodologies and results of experimental science which he accepted and admired. Second, Darwin’s theory of natural selection suggested in a more particular way the form which a naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge should take. Dewey also came to believe that a productive, naturalistic approach to the theory of knowledge must begin with a consideration of the development of knowledge as an adaptive human response to environing conditions aimed at an active restructuring of these conditions. Unlike traditional, approaches in the theory of knowledge, which saw thought as a subjective primitive out of which knowledge was composed, Dewey’s approach understands between organism and environment, and knowledge as having practical instrumentality in the guidance and control of that interaction. Thus Dewey adopted the term “instrumentalism” as a descriptive appellation for his new approach.

Dewey first applied this interactive naturalism in an explicit manner to the theory of knowledge in an explicit manner in his four introductory essays in studies in logical theory. Dewey identified the view expressed in studies with the school of pragmatism, crediting William James as its progenitor. A detailed genetic analysis of the process of inquiry is Dewey’s signal contribution to studies. Dewey distinguished three phases of the process. Being with the problematic situation, a situation where instinctive or habitual responses of the human organism to the environment are inadequate for the continuation of ongoing activity in pursuit of the fulfillment of needs and desires. Dewey stressed in studies and subsequent writing that the uncertainty of the problematic situation is not inherently cognitive but practical and existential.

Cognitive elements enter into the process as a response to precognitive maladjustment. The second phase of the process involves the isolation of the data or subject matter which defines the parameters within which the reconstruction of the initiating are entertained as hypothetical solutions to the originating impediment of the problematic situation, the implications of which are pursued in the abstract. The final test of the adequacy of these solutions comes with their employment in action. If a construction of the antecedent situation conducive to fluid activity is achieved, then the solution no longer retains the character of the hypothetical that marks cognitive thought; rather it becomes a part o the existential circumstances of human life. From this perspective, Dewey reconsiders many of the topics of traditional logic such as the distinction between deductive and inductive inference, propositional form, and the nature of logical reasoning.